Becoming and being: Atheism as a social experience in Egypt by Al-Soukkary, Wael Ossama
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
2-1-2015 
Becoming and being: Atheism as a social experience in Egypt 
Wael Ossama Al-Soukkary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Al-Soukkary, W. (2015).Becoming and being: Atheism as a social experience in Egypt [Master’s thesis, the 
American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/211 
MLA Citation 
Al-Soukkary, Wael Ossama. Becoming and being: Atheism as a social experience in Egypt. 2015. 
American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/211 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 











Becoming and Being: Atheism as a Social 
Experience in Egypt 
Research project for masters of Arts In anthropology  














First and foremost I am mostly grateful for my mother Ines. No words can ever express how 
much your support, care, love, understanding and sense of humor means to me.  
I am also very grateful for my wife Rasha for bearing with me in general and particularly the last 
couple of years. You’re a true warrior!  
This research couldn’t have been made possible without the limitless support from Professor 
Hanan Sabea. When I think of how far I’ve come since when I first thought of an idea for my 
research and where it finally ended, I see your marks all over. You’ve been a great professor but 
also a great friend and adversary.  
A very special thanks is due to Professor Ramy Aly who had helped me, to the best of my 
abilities, improve this research. Your insights were very helpful and revealing.  
I am also obliged to Professor Munira El-Khayatt whose class has been my first real encounter 
with how deliciously uncomfortable Anthropology classes can be.  
I am very grateful to Karim El-Sharkawy whom I’ve spent with countless hours in serious study 
sessions throughout the writing of this project. You’ve helped me defeat the monster of 
procrastination!  
I would also like to extend my gratitude to my interlocutors who have taken a lot of their time, 
effort and emotion to speak to me. I hope this research would be helpful and interesting to you 
somehow.  
I am in eternal gratitude to online search engines.  
Finally I must acknowledge the relentless efforts of the workers who kept bringing coal to my 
shisha. They were the true force behind this work. I hope that I’ve tipped you well  










TABLE OF CONTENT 
Chapter One: Introduction .......................................................................................................................................3 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................3 
2. Background .......................................................................................................................................................3 
3. Conceptual Framework ................................................................................................................................. 11 
4. Methodology ................................................................................................................................................. 17 
Chapter Two: The Body and the Family. Religious Socialization and Resistance to Embodied Cultural 
Formations ............................................................................................................................................................. 19 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 19 
2. Review of the Literature ................................................................................................................................ 19 
3. Pathways to Atheism: Loose Religious Socialization and Apostasy .............................................................. 24 
4. Pathways to Atheism: Moderate Religious Socialization and Apostasy ........................................................ 28 
5. Pathways to Atheism: Cultural Embodiment and Resistance ....................................................................... 34 
6. Religion: Reciprocity and Subjugation ........................................................................................................... 40 
7. Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................................................... 42 
Chapter Three: Globalization and Atheism. The Implications of Cultural Hybridity and Cyberspace................. 44 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 44 
2. Review of the Literature ................................................................................................................................ 45 
3. Pathways to Atheism: Cultural Hybridity and the Formation of Values and Identities ................................ 50 
4. Pathway to Atheism: Cyberspace and Unregulated Knowledge ................................................................... 55 
5. Religion and Atheism: the Interplay of Discourses ........................................................................................ 57 
6. Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................................................... 58 
Chapter Four: Identity. Being Atheist and Coping Mechanisms ........................................................................... 61 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 61 
2. Review of the Literature ................................................................................................................................ 62 
4. Being Atheist in Egypt: Passing ...................................................................................................................... 66 
5. Being Atheist in Egypt: Affirmation ............................................................................................................... 69 
6. Being Atheist in Egypt: Pretending ................................................................................................................ 72 
8. Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................................................... 74 
Chapter Five: The (Im)pious City .......................................................................................................................... 76 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 76 
2. Review of the Literature ................................................................................................................................ 76 
3. Close but not Enough: Vicinity and Accommodation of Impiety .................................................................. 80 
4. Visibility: The Regulation of Public Space ...................................................................................................... 82 
5. A Brothel in Disguise: Negotiation of Identity, Behavior and Public Space ................................................... 84 
2 
 
6. Being Atheist in Egypt: The (Im)pious City .................................................................................................... 86 
7. Religion and Atheism: between Belief and Practice ...................................................................................... 87 
8. Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................................................... 89 
Chapter Six. The Egyptian State and Atheists: The Straw-man ............................................................................. 91 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 91 
2. The State and Religion: Conceptualizing Interdependence .......................................................................... 91 
3. The State and Al-Azhar: An Uneasy Alliance ................................................................................................. 93 
4. The Egyptian State and Atheists: A State of Exception ................................................................................. 98 
5. The Egyptian State and Atheists: Moral Panic and the Savage Slot ............................................................ 100 
6. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................................................... 103 
Chapter Seven. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 105 
1. Summary ...................................................................................................................................................... 105 
2. Deduction .................................................................................................................................................... 107 
3. Limitations of the Research ......................................................................................................................... 107 
 
































     Egypt ranks among the highest countries in the perceived importance of religion to its population. 
Around 98% of Egyptians have professed that religion is particularly important in their lives (Gallup, 
2010). This sentiment is expressed in legal documents such as the constitution declares in the second 
article that “Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language. The principles of 
Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation”. Furthermore, the state actively prosecutes 
individuals whose behaviour in some cases is deemed as “acts of debauchery, defamation of religion 
and violation of public morals”. If, indeed, impiety and irreligion, and by extension atheism, are 
frowned upon by both the state and society how could we understand atheism as a social experience in 
Egypt? Why have some individuals, despite the centrality of religion to socialization and the potential 
grave consequences, turn into atheism? Furthermore, how do these atheists situate themselves in 
Egyptian society and particularly how do they cope with the stigma associated with atheism? The 
state's role as a vanguard of public morals and religion as well as the population's heightened sense of 
religiosity creates the need for many Egyptians to devise ways by which their religious identity is 
negotiated in the everyday and on special occasions vis-à-vis their desired lifestyle and. This need is 
further intensified by the diversity of values within the Egyptian culture, exposure to globalization and 
relative allowance and acceptance of different lifestyles and occasional or permanent changes in 
behaviour. This research will attempt to answer these questions by exploring some of the pathways to 
atheism and the various coping mechanisms that are employed by some Egyptian atheists to function in 
society to avert or confront social backlash. 
2. Background  
The Visibility of Egyptian Atheists 
There are several indicators to the persecution of Egyptian Atheists in Egypt. Firstly, several outspoken 
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Egyptian atheists are legally charged with “defamation of religion” which could amount to sentencing 
of 5 years in prison. In September 2013 The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) released a 
report, entitled Besieging the Freedom of Thought, which documented 63 new cases of defamation of 
religion. This figure marked a 100% increase compared to the figures of blasphemy cases prior to the 
2011 uprising. Targets of these cases includes atheists and Christians as well as Muslims who are 
outspoken against mainstream Islamic discourse. Secondly, several media outlets have outlined 
outspoken Egyptian atheists as a “phenomenon” that requires confrontation and intervention. This 
media outcry amounted to a state response by which a campaign to “battle atheism” was officially 
launched to counter the ideas of Egyptian atheists. Official religious institutions spokespeople in charge 
of the campaign have proclaimed that atheists are a threat to Egypt's national security and are agents of 
foreign agendas to destabilize the Egyptian society. Accordingly, atheism in Egypt is proclaimed to be 
as much of a threat to the Egyptian society as radical and militant Islamists. Finally, the personal 
experience in the everyday details of the lives of some Egyptian atheists reveal a substantial hostility 
and discrimination if their atheist identity becomes known. 
The January 2011 uprising marked a significant shift in the targets of anti-blasphemy cases where more 
and more individuals are dragged to courts over their views and opinions about religion. In December 
2012 Albert Saber, a blogger and a cyber-activist, was sentenced to three years in prison by a court that 
found him guilty of defamation of religioni.On October 2013 Sherif Gaber, a young university student, 
was arrested for creating a Facebook group that allegedly propagated atheismii. Karam Saber an author, 
was sentenced to five-years in jail after being found guilty of defamation of religion over his book 
“Where is God?”iii – A collection of short stories. On October 2014 Ahmed Harqan, an outspoken 
atheist, was detained in a police station in Alexandria with his wife after they went to report an assault 
by an angry mob which recognized him from a TV appearance where he was critical of Islam. The 
couple, who were released the next day, reported that policemen harassed and insulted them during 
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their stay in the station.  A few of lawyers have declared that they are already preparing a blasphemy 
case against Harqan for the views he expressed on TV and onlineiv. On December 2014, Cairo's Abdeen 
directorate raided with the police what they identified as an “atheists cafe” and shut it down after 
receiving complains that atheists gathered there. v 
Several Atheist Facebook groups, Twitter accounts and YouTube Channels that appeal to Egyptian 
audiences have been created after January 2011 with different approaches and goals. Some of these 
online activities are specialized in particular topics or themes such as promoting scientific explanations 
of the world, mockery of religion, rational discourse or connecting atheists to each other. In addition 
several atheists have appeared on private TV channels to debate their views or their position in society 
with other guests, usually Azhar scholars, as well as TV hosts. In short, there is an undeniable 
unprecedented surge of Egyptian Atheists who are actively engaging with their society to promote their 
beliefs, promote scientific world-views, defend their rights or generally criticize religion. In some cases 
critique of religion extends beyond rational or constructive criticism into mockery and insult to 
religious symbols and values.  
This surge has been met with gradual outcry on Egyptian media with one particular TV host, 
Muhammad Moussa, vowing on his show Redline on Honest TV channel to “expose” Atheists who 
“sabotage” religion. Mustapha Zakariah, an activist and atheist, proclaimed on Moussa's show that 
while he is not interested in mocking Islam, he is striving for being accepted as an atheist by his 
society. Nevertheless, Moussa demanded that Zakariah is detained and executed as a punishment for his 
atheism. Amin Ezz Al-Din, Alexandria's Security Directorate chief, said on the same show that a 
special police unit is being planned to arrest openly vocal atheists who are active on Facebook. Inviting 
atheists to TV talk shows has become a frequent reoccurring spectacle with the discussion usually 
turning into a loud and frantic confrontation and, occasionally, the host kicking out or ridiculing their 
atheist guests. In addition, and perhaps prior to confrontation on the media, several Facebook groups 
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and pages have also been created to counter atheists' activities on Facebook with several aims such as 
attempting to open a dialogue or demanding that the government takes action against Egyptian atheists 
with these demands ranging from initiating a modern religious discourse to arrests and execution.  
The outcry culminated in a state sponsored “campaign to battle Atheism” initiated by the Ministry of 
Youth, Ministry of Sport and Ministry of Endowment on June 2014. Naemat Sati, the director of the 
campaign, announced that a group of psychiatrists, sociologists and religion scholars will engage 
Egyptian Youth to curb the phenomena and “get atheists back to their religionvi”. The Minister of 
Endowment, Mokhtar Gomaa, also accepted a proposal by Al-Azhar scholars to launch a program to 
train Imams and youth on refuting atheism, “curing” atheists and “raising awareness of its [atheism] 
dangers to morals and the nation”.vii 
Demography of Religion in Egypt 
Egyptians are predominantly Muslim with around 80 to 90% of the population ascribing to Islam with a 
sweeping majority adhering to Sunni Islam. However, the umbrella of Sunni Islam in Egypt includes 
diverse expressions of the faith including numerous Sufi orders, Salafi groups, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, followers of televangelists, official state institutions such as Al-Azhar and Dar Al-Ifta, , 
an official state institution that issues fatwas, as well as nonaffiliated millions of Egyptian Muslims. 
Qur'anists, a sect that only adopts interpretations of the Qur’an and denies the authenticity of the 
Hadith (sayings) attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, is known to exist without any means to identify 
their numbers. While there are no official records about the numbers of Egyptian Shia Muslims, it has 
been estimated that there are at least around 1 million Egyptian Shiites.  
Most of the remaining Egyptians, an estimation of 10-20% of the population, ascribe to Christianity 
who mostly belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria with the exception of an estimated 
600,000 Christians that are more or less equally divided between the Coptic Catholic Church and 
Protestant Church. In addition there are small Baha'i and Jewish communities with an estimated 
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membership of 2,000 and 200 people consecutively. The state only officially recognizes the three 
Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and therefore it is difficult to estimate the 
number of adherents to other religions or the number of irreligious Egyptians since they are not counted 
in the official census of Egypt. There are, however, some statistical indications that irreligion is 
uncommon in Egypt. According to a 2009 Gallup poll 100% of Egyptians proclaimed that religion is an 
important part of their daily lives. There is at least a margin of error of ±4% in addition to sampling 
errors and other difficulties in conducting the poll that might produce a bias in public opinion 
representations. The Gallup poll is in line with a 2013 Pew poll that shows that 84% of Egyptian 
Muslims are in favor of the death penalty as a punishment for leaving Islam and that 95% of Egyptian 
Muslims are in favor of Islam playing a large role in politics. Such views highlight the stigma 
associated with irreligion in Egypt and, consequently, the added difficulties with quantifying Egyptian 
atheists and agnostics who may prefer to keep their religious views confidential to protect themselves 
from legal prosecution and social stigma. Despite these difficulties Dar Al-Ifta proclaimed that there 
are only 866 Atheists in Egypt as part of the official state campaign and statements to “battle 
atheism”viii.  
Defamation of Religion in Mubarak's Era 
To begin to understand the state's reaction to public discussion about atheism in Egypt, it is important 
to first acknowledge that hostility towards proclamation of irreligion or publicly disagreeing with 
mainstream religious discourse is not recent. Acknowledging the relatively recent history of religious 
persecution in Egypt is important because, firstly, it dispels the exclusiveness of Egyptian atheists' 
struggle with the state. Secondly, and more importantly, it contextualizes hostility towards atheism in 
Egypt within a bigger frame of state policies and public sentiments towards the practice freedom of 
religion and the use of the public space accordingly. In other words, the state regardless of the political 
climate at any given time has been more or less consistent with its vigilance against dissidents of 
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mainstream religious discourse. In fact, many parallels could be drawn between instances of violation 
of freedom of belief post January 2011 and the former president Mubarak’s regime. For example, 
blasphemy cases that reached a peak during the Islamists' rise to power have many precedents during 
Mubarak's era. Naawal El Saadawy, an outspoken controversial Egyptian feminist who was once 
imprisoned by President Sadat in early 1980s, was accused of defamation of religion in 2007 after 
publishing an article entitled “God Resigns”. Nasr Hamd Abu-Zayd, a prominent Islamic studies 
professor and a liberal theologian was found guilty of apostasy in 1995 by an Egyptian appeal court 
and was accordingly forcefully divorced from his wife since, according to Egyptian laws, non-Muslim 
men can't marry Muslim women. Despite viewing himself as a Muslim, his interpretation of the Qur'an 
and particularly inventing a humanistic hermeneutic view of Islamic texts offended fundamentalists and 
Islamic radicals. Ahmed Sobhi Mansour, a Muslim history professor, was expelled from Al-Azhar 
University in 1985 due to his views over the authenticity of the sayings attributed to Muhammad the 
prophet of Islam. In 1987 he was trialed and imprisoned for 6 months. Farag Fouda, a professor and an 
influential critique of Islamism, was assassinated by Al-Gama Al-Islameya in 1992. According to a 
statement by the group, his apostasy, advocating the separation of religion and state as well as 
defending Egypt's legal system rather than implementing Sharia law justified his assassination. Before 
he was killed, Al-Azhar accused him of blasphemy echoing a fatwa issued by Gad Al-Haq who accused 
Fouda of being “an enemy of Islam”. Seen by some observers as moderate interpreters of Islam, neither 
Al-Azhar nor the Muslim brotherhood condemned the assassination. Muhammad Al-Ghazaly, an Azhar 
scholar and a prominent Islamic reformist, argued in the trial of Fouda's killers, where he was 
summoned as a witness, that apostasy is punishable by death and that the “Imam” (the Egyptian state 
leader in this context) has failed to apply Sharia by not punishing Fouda himself. More than 20 years 
later, Muslim brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi proclaimed during his successful bid for 
presidency in an interview on CBC, a private TV channel, that apostates are “corrupted” and that “ailed 
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body parts should be severed from society”. While in Egyptian laws apostasy is not a crime, it has legal 
repercussions such as in the case of terminating Abu-Zayd's marriage or imprisonment of Mansour. 
Defamation of religion, if associated with apostasy in the court, would amount to similar legal 
repercussions. In short, free-speech and freedom of religion could endanger the lives and the liberty of 
Egyptian citizens who cross the line set by, otherwise, conflicting groups. This has been the trend 
regardless of the conflict between the state and Islamists. Just as in the case of Mansour, Fouda and 
Abu-Zayd who all identified themselves as Muslims, other Muslims and particularly members of Sufi 
orders often find their festivals and ceremonies tightly regulated by the government with the consent of 
Al-Azhar and hardliner Islamists alike. Criminalizing dissidence and/or challenge to mainstream 
religious discourse carried on post January 2011 revolution only with a slight significant change; the 
targets of prosecution were no longer exclusively public figures. 
Defamation of Religion Post 2011 Uprising 
In September 2013 Ishaq Ibrahim of The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights presented a report 
entitled “the siege of thought” documenting 63 cases of defamation of religion since the January 2011 
uprising. This time period covers both the transitional phase under the rule of the Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces' rule as well as president Morsi's one year reign that was ended by the military after 
massive protests. According to Ibrahim many of the defendants are facing trials over opinions 
expressed on social media or at their work place. EIPR claims that the defendants are denied their 
rights to due process as their lawyers sometimes find it hard to get to the trial on time as crowds of 
people purposefully block the entrance to the court. EIPR also claims that some judges are often 
“nonobjective” by resorting to the maximum punishment allowed. EIPR's report is in line with an 
Amnesty International statement on June 2013 that warned about the increase in blasphemy cases 
against bloggers, media personnel and Christians. The amnesty report also criticized the state's inability 
to properly protect the defendants’ right to due process. The continuous increase and rise in blasphemy 
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cases is a reminder that the ideological differences and political hostilities between the state and 
Islamists as well as between different Islamist groups are somewhat blurred when it comes to freedom 
of belief and freedom of expression. 
Freedom of Religion and Sectarian Violence 
The state is not the only contender to freedom of religion and its free expression. Egypt has witnessed 
quite a few instances of sectarian violence which reached its peak in the aftermath of Morsi's ouster in 
2013. After the Egyptian police violently dispersed the armed protest camps organized by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Rabaa and Nahda squares in Cairo, at least 30 churches were destroyed or looted by 
angry mobs. Many private properties, schools and shops known to be owned or run by Christians were 
also targeted and attacked. Almost a year and a half prior in an event publicly known as the Maspero 
Massacre, 28 people were killed and 212 were injured by security forces and the military on October 
2011. The deceased were mainly Christian protesters who were reacting to the destruction of a church, 
claimed to have been built without a license, in Upper Egypt. On that night, Rasha Magdy a 
broadcaster at the national TV, called on the air upon “righteous citizens” to help and protect the army 
from “angry Christian protesters”.  
Violence against Christians and the state's failure to offer protection also has precedencies in Mubarak's 
era. On January 2000, a dispute between a Christian merchant and a Muslim spiraled into massive riots 
in Al-Kosheh, a village in Upper Egypt. Al-Kosheh is largely populated by Christians who own most of 
the shops that serve neighboring Muslim agricultural villages. Local authorities exercised almost no 
effort to control the situation which spiraled into the systematic burning and looting of hundreds of 
Christian owned shops and houses. 21 Christians were killed, mostly in the agricultural fields owned by 
Muslims. Furthermore, according to a Daily Telegraph report, several Christians who were arrested 
were also harassed and tortured in the police stations. 
Christians, however, are not the only sect ever to be antagonized by angry bloodthirsty mobs. In June 
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2013 and during Morsi's reign, a group of Egyptian Shiites were targeted by an angry mob that 
premeditated a deadly attackix. The mobs torched Shiite houses and killed a few people including 
Sheikh Hassan Shehata who was a prominent Shiite religious leader. While many of the perpetrators 
were later arrested and sentenced to prison, this event highlighted the increasing hostility and rejection 
towards a fragile and peripheral Shiite minority. Similarly in 2009 during Mubarak's era, several Baha'i 
families were also targeted by angry mobs who torched their houses to force them to leave their areasx. 
The state was not impartial to the plight of Egyptian Baha'i as the Ministry of Interior positioned itself 
as an opponent to their appeal to Egyptian courts to recognize their religion in national ID cards in 
2006. 
 So far through this historical overview I've been attempting to establish two points: (1) the systematic 
violations of religious freedom in Egypt and (2) that such violations hardly differentiate between 
people who identify themselves as Muslims, Christians, Baha'i, Shiites or Atheists. Indeed each case 
has its own specificities such as, for example, Egyptian Christians having the advantage of being 
recognized by the state and being supported by an official religious institution or that atheists and 
Shiites could easily choose to become more or less invisible or that Baha'i were at one point recognized 
by the state and could allude to the rights they had not so long ago. However, it should be noted that 
any discussion or study about a religious marginalized sect or an individual should be contextualized 
within the recognition that society that has experienced numerous episodes of hostility towards 
freedom of religion. In other words, the case of Egyptian atheists, is not an exception to an otherwise a 
tolerant state or society. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
Religion  
Any discussion about atheism is intrinsically also a discussion about religion. Studying atheism as a 
social experience also invokes an investigation on the implications of religion on socialization and 
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particularly the formation of identity, values and knowledge about accepted modes of behavior. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, irreligion is highly uncommon in Egypt and most parents would 
typically, with varying degrees, attempt to socialize their offspring religiously. Furthermore, religion is 
greatly imbricated with the state’s discourse about political organization, public morality, citizenship 
and perhaps the very nature of the state itself. The very fact that both the Egyptian state and general 
political climate are largely invested in religion blurs the lines between the private and the public 
aspects of religion. In addition, the significant importance and centrality of religion in Egypt to its 
population incites us to consider that belief and internalization of religion is a social property as much 
as it is individualistic.  
The discussion in these terms invokes the debate between Clifford Geertz and Talal Asad on the 
meaning and attributes of religion. The debate could be outlined by a basic question; is religion merely 
a system of beliefs and symbols or is it a product and an instrument of power relations that are shaped 
by the broader social, cultural, economic and political context?  
Geertz (2000) defines religion as a “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, 
and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the mood and motivations 
seem uniquely realistic” (90). In a sense what Geertz is trying to accomplish with this definition is to 
draw attention to the process by which religion influences and shapes human action by imagining a 
supernatural order of the world that is projected on all details of the human experience. To Geertz this 
could only be accomplished by understanding the system of meanings that is embedded within the 
symbols constituting religion. Accordingly, and only then, are we able to relate religion, as a system of 
symbols, to individual psychological processes as well as the social and cultural contexts. In short 
Geertz is arguing for a theoretical separation between symbols and social events where the former is 
theoretically “abstractable” from the latter (91). In other words, Geertz is arguing that the meanings of 
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symbols and, accordingly, the power of interpretation are not only pivotal to understanding social 
action but also supersede exploring religion in relation to its broader context.  
Conversely, Talal Asad (1993) argues that defining religion as a system of symbols and meanings is 
conceptually flawed on several grounds. Firstly, Asad argues that religion doesn’t have an “autonomous 
essence” and accordingly meaning is not intrinsically embedded within religious symbols (28). 
Therefore, Asad argues that, contrary to Geertz’s assertion, there can be no universal definition of 
religion not only because of the historical specifics but also because that any definition is “the historical 
product of discursive practices” (29). Accordingly, Asad argues that Geertz’s definition is specific to 
Western and modern Christianity particularly because of Geertz’s “primacy of meaning without regard 
to the process by which meanings are constructed” (43). Asad’s critique highlights his dissatisfaction 
with the assertion that meaning and social events could be theoretically abstracted and separated. Asad 
insists that conceptualizing religion could not be separated from the questions of power and historical 
specifics that shape the meanings attached to religious symbols. Therefore, Asad proposes that religion 
is a “discursive tradition” that cannot be conveniently separated from other aspects of social life and is 
rather imbricated with manifestations and exercise of power in all social domains (28).  
Based on the discussion above there are three aspects that must be synthesized with our 
conceptualization of religion while at the same breath avoiding a universal or fixed definition. Firstly, 
religion is political and the separation of church and state is conceptually flawed. Secondly, in line with 
the first observation, religion is part and parcel of the public sphere. In other words, we’re invited to 
think about religion as not just merely beliefs and symbols but also both a product and a producer of 
the larger social, political and economic context. This involvement and imbrication with the public 
sphere extends to personal articulations and expressions of religion by which the individual carries the 
duty (or the burden) of maintaining, reproducing and abiding by the social order and his subjectivity. 
Thirdly, religious belief and behavior are not separate categories of analysis but are rather intertwined 
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in a way where belief motivates and develops behavior. Coincidently, behavior is a barometer and a 
reflection of belief that is constantly expressed and tested. This is not to say, however, that impiety 
necessarily disenchants or dispels society’s perception of a given individual’s religious identity. On the 
contrary, just as society also develops ways and techniques of reproducing and enforcing public 
morality, it also devises ways by which impiety is regulated and even largely tolerated. In other words, 
religion is imbricated with both piety and impiety that, to some degree, one could not be conceptualized 
without the other.  
The Pathway to Atheism 
The pathway to atheism, or becoming atheist, describes the overarching combination of variables such 
as cultural influences, socioeconomic status, life experiences, ideas and emotions that predispose 
individuals to atheism. The term may seem to imply that becoming atheist is a linear process from one 
point, such as belief or at least experiencing religious socialization, to another final point; disbelief and 
atheism. However, in application, the term is intended to highlight that conversion to atheism is a fluid 
process. Furthermore, it intends to highlight that along the “pathway” there are several factors and 
experiences that make becoming atheist an imaginable possibility and a conceivable perspective on, at 
least, the natural world. Conceptualizing conversion to atheism as a pathway with several interplaying 
variables and factors invites us to avoid reductionist explanations of atheism as a social experience that 
amplify the influence and role of one variable over the others. It also invites us to consider that 
becoming atheist is a significantly individualistic experience that corresponds to some of the unique 
details of the lives of individuals who forfeit religion and turn to atheism. In other words, the pathway 
to atheism encompasses different variables that, when combined and overlapped, make atheism a 
conceivable and imaginable viable and relevant world-view.  
Religious Socialization  
Religious socialization is the process by which individuals learn and acquire the religious beliefs and 
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religiously inspired values, modes of behavior, world-views and sentiments. Conceptualizing 
socialization into different clear cut categories, including religious socialization, is not meant to ignore 
the imbricative characteristic of the process where multiple discourses and agendas often overlap and 
even contradict each other. Instead it is meant to draw our attention to the significance and centrality of 
religion within a particular familial context and the consequences of it. Accordingly, we also need to 
account for the possibility of the varying degrees of centrality and significance of religion within the 
family and in the process of socialization rather than imposing it on the discussion as a fixed 
categorical analysis. Therefore, my examination of religious socialization within the family will 
particularly entail how individuals transform into atheism despite, or as a result, of the varying degrees 
of intensity of religious socialization.  
Biopower  
Biopower describes the means by the state regulates and controls its subjects through a plethora of 
ways to subjugate their bodies (Foucault, 1977). Manifestations of biopower includes birth control, 
classifications of mental and physical illnesses, public health policies, body alterations and dress codes.  
Accordingly, I will examine how the body becomes a site of religious cultural formation. I will 
particularly address the consequences and the influences of biopower, when applicable, on the 
individual experiences of atheists whether before or after their turn to atheism. Additionally, employing 
biopower invokes a deeper examination of the imbrication of the state’s social agenda and the family’s 
desires and expectations for their children. By doing so we would also be able to account for the 
dynamic influences of state control as well as the reproduction of religious knowledge within the 
family on the development of atheism as both an identity and a world-view.  
Cultural Hybridity  
Cultural Hybridity is the notion that there are expressions and elements of culture that are not 
historically or geographically intrinsic. Accordingly, these expressions and elements of culture are a 
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product of globalization and particularly the consequences of overseas employment, free flow of 
information, world trade and displacement. Cultural Hybridity invokes a non-essentialist or authentic 
conceptualization of a particular culture that considers its multi-faceted, overlapping and possibly 
contradicting elements. Accordingly, I will examine cultural influences other than religious 
socialization and particularly the implications of globalization on identity formation and lifestyles. This 
is crucial to building a better grounded and more rounded understanding of how individuals develop 
their desires, emotions, ideas and beliefs. By doing so we would also be able to account for the 
dynamics and repercussions of the interplay and tension between different discourses and their 
influences on identity formation.  
Coping Mechanisms  
There is a significant stigma that is associated with atheism that renders atheists as morally inferior, 
corrupted and dangerous. The repercussions of being identified as an atheist could incur social 
banishment and legal prosecution. Consequently, many atheists may often find themselves in a position 
where they need to manage their identity vis-à-vis the potential repression and backlash associated with 
the terms of social placement of atheism. Coping mechanisms describes the different strategies by 
which atheists manage their identity generally or in particular social contexts. Accordingly, I will 
examine ways by which atheists position their atheist identity among other the identities that they've 
acquired. By extension I will also examine how this positioning influences their behavior and their own 
placement in their social world.  
The (Im)pious City  
The discussion on coping mechanisms will also involve conceptualizing public space as both a frontier 
of religious cultural formation and a medium of identity negotiation and accommodation of alternative 
lifestyles. The (Im)pious City describes the fluidity of civic life in relation to social arrangements 
pertaining to religion that regulate social behavior and recreate the broader contexts of social order and 
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public morality. This fluidity and flexibility is employed by a large segment of Egyptians, including 
atheists, to find avenues where the social expectations dictated by religious identities become loosened 
and less restrictive.  
The Savage-Slot  
Trouillot (1991) calls for anthropologists to critically analyze and contextualize the present 
anthropology which must be seen as a product of a history that includes, both, “the history and 
prehistory of Anthropology” (Fox, 22).  The prehistory of Anthropology that Trouillot deems is 
necessary for proper critical analysis and contextualization of the discipline is the history that “starts 
with the emergence of symbolic feud that made formalization of Anthropology possible” (Fox, 23). 
This feud started with the emergence of Christendom as Europe and the rise of religious intolerance as 
Abrahamic religions struggled over the Mediterranean and Spain which, and as a result, put politics, 
ideologies and the notion of order “high on the agenda” (Fox 31). This notion of order, to make sense, 
is contrasted and put against Utopias (the exotic or different others) which essentially requires what 
Trouilliot calls the savage slot. 
4. Methodology 
This research attempts to study the variety of ways by which some Egyptian atheists experience and 
respond to the tension between appropriate social behavior and religious beliefs vis-à-vis their own 
desires and ideas. Consequently, there is not a particular group under study and I will make no claims 
of representing Egyptian atheists.  
For security and social reasons it is difficult to locate Egyptian atheists let alone convince them to 
participate in a study regardless of the steps taken to conceal their identity and protect their privacy. I 
will, thus, rely on snowball sampling.  
An important point to clarify is that while there are philosophical differences between agnostics and 
atheists, they will both be included in my research. The main reason I think this is acceptable is that the 
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differences between both is not recognized by the state’s public discourse since simply not believing in 
God or having doubts practically puts them under the category of atheism. My methodological 
approach will ensue to answer a basic question; how are atheist identities formed, negotiated, concealed 
or purposefully amplified in a restrictive social and an increasingly volatile political contexts?  
The research will include both a library research as well as elements of ethnographic research that will 
entail participant observation in three local cafés where a group of friends, largely atheists, gather every 
couple of days to socialize. In the library research I will be strictly employing secondary analysis of 
qualitative and quantitative studies that are related to the topic of research. I will also conduct a 
discourse analysis of the state's campaign to battle atheism with emphasis on the relationship between 
the state and its religious institutions and the political context through which this campaign operates. 
I will save no effort or take any chances on protecting the rights, lives and privacy of my interlocutors 
or subjects of study. I will, accordingly, ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of my interlocutors. 
All names of my interlocutors will be randomly coded in the field notes. Any information that has a 
potential of revealing the identity of my interlocutors will not be used in the research. Furthermore, all 
my interlocutors will be told their rights prior to the interviews and no coercion or financial/social 
leverages or other means of exploitation of any social vulnerability will be exercised to compel them to 
participate. I will encrypt all the documents and files in my personal computer which I will have the 



















     The family is the first primary orchestrator and source of socialization. Verily the broader culture, 
religion, the media, educational institutes, the judiciary system and the state may overlap, influence, 
override and, conversely, giveaway to the socialization process through the family. Nevertheless, 
because the family is the most immediate and first social interaction avenue for individuals, it’s pivotal 
to begin any investigation on the formation of identity, beliefs, values and modes of behavior through 
an examination of the process of socialization through the family. This is particularly because it could 
offer us insights on the very first clues as to how individual become who they are and how their 
identities are then accepted, integrated or regulated by the family as the first social frontier of the 
formation of cultural and moral values. On a similar note, and particularly with the question on the 
regulation of beliefs and identities, the body represents a relevant and necessary field for investigation. 
As it will be discussed in the literature review and based on interviews with my interlocutors, the body 
is highly involved with cultural and identity formation since it's both a medium of socialization and 
resistance. Furthermore, the implications of cultural embodiment are particularly significant on the 
development of atheist identities in Egyptian upper middle class settings. To establish the theoretical 
and conceptual framework for my analysis on the accounts of my interlocutors' pathway to atheism 
through religious socialization and resistance to the embodiment of culture, I will review some of the 
literature on both issues upon which I will proceed with the discussion.   
2. Review of the Literature 
Religious Socialization and Formation of Religious Identity 
The family as a social unit is of a fundamental and critical influence and importance in people's lives. 
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After all, the individual's first social experience is with members of his family. The family's 
socioeconomic status, core values and structure is not only pivotal to socialization but could also alter 
and define the ways by which an individual experience the broader social world. Furthermore, the 
different types and quality of familial relationships; cohesion, adaptability and communication; have a 
significant influence on the individual's quality of life (Lamanna, Reidman and Stewart; 2012). The 
family could also be perceived as a political project of the state through which citizens are trained and 
raised to acquire desired standards, attitudes and beliefs that accept and facilitate cooperation with the 
political system. Take for example the Soviet Union's anti-religious campaigns from 1928 to 1941 that 
promoted atheism and actively persecuted entire religious communities and families (Timasheff and 
Kolarz, 1963) or the United States’ intervention policies that enforce compulsory schooling and welfare 
payments to families (Becker and Murphy, 1988).  
Sociological and anthropological literature on religious socialization in the family are abundant and are 
conceptually established in the canon and consequent studies. There has been a growing interest 
however since the 1970s in sociological and anthropological study of socialization and irreligion to 
address the largely overlooked implications of apostasy and disbelief on related social issues that were 
typically perceived and analyzed through the social study of religion (for ex: Brinkerhoff and Burke, 
1980; Caplovitz and Sherrow, 1977; Welch, 1978). In their Study of Canadian college students, 
Caplovitz and Sherrow (1977) argue that there are four main factors that predispose individuals to 
become apostates or disbelievers. The four factor are poor relations with parents, neurosis, radical 
political orientation and commitment to intellectualism. Caplovitz and Sherrow also frame apostasy as 
an act of rebellion against parents due to dissociation and poor quality familial relationships. Brown 
and Hansberger (1984), however, argue that none of these factors have been empirically substantiated 
or supported (239). Instead, Hansberger (1983) argues that the level of centrality and relevance of 
religion in the family is the most important factors that predisposes individuals to become apostates or 
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nonbelievers. This is highlighted by Hansberger’s later study of Australian college students which 
demonstrated that apostates are more likely to be living away from their childhood home (241). 
Hansberger’s argument sits well with previous studies that concede that religious development is 
significantly tied to the parental religious orientation (for ex: Hoge and Petrillo, 1978; Johnson, 1973; 
Strommen, 1963). Similarly, Hart Nelsen (1990) argues that there is a clear correlation between the 
family's religious socialization and the individual's religious beliefs where 84% of the children who 
grew up with parents who had no religion became disbelievers themselves.  
Review of the Literature: Embodied Cultural Formation 
For a very long time in social sciences the study of the body was strictly considered an exclusive 
domain for natural sciences. Keat (1986) contends that while social scientists have invested much time 
and thought on the peculiarity and uniqueness of mankind, they appeared to have no qualms with the 
presumption that the human bodies were mute and not particularly relevant to social research (127). 
Positivism, rationalism and the rise of scientific inquiry compelled social thinkers to think of the body 
as simply an object that is separate from social awareness and cognitive interaction with the social 
world. However, a paradigm shift ensued in the 1970s as more social scientists paid closer attention to 
the ways by which the body and sociocultural phenomenon such as rituals, gestures, expression of 
values, politics and power, to name a few, are related. Rendering the body as a social phenomenon in 
the 1970s has roots in earlier researches of anthropologists and social thinkers that were slowly 
breaking away from the body-mind and nature-culture dualities that dominated western thought for 
centuries. Durkheim (1965) proclaimed that “man is double” where there is an observable 
differentiation between the organic natural body and the “socialized” body that acquires significant 
moral and cultural attachments (52). Mauss (1935), along similar lines, argued that the physical, 
cognitive and social spheres were imbricated and overlapping and, thus, demonstrated that everyday 
uses of the body are intertwined with and consequential to specific and temporal cultural practices 
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(172). Hertz (1973) argued that differences in moral and ritualistic ascriptions of the body in many 
cultures, for instance dignifying the use of the right hand, are constructs and representations of “the 
structure of social thought” (58). Durkheim, Mauss and Hertz studies on the employment of natural 
symbols associated with the body to recreate social structure and social order exposed the relationship 
between these social constructs and the body. This paved the way for an explosive plethora of literature 
and research on the body and its socialized characteristics where, accordingly, the use of natural 
symbols associated with the body was argued to be a representation of both group inclusion and unity 
as well as exclusion and hierarchy (Douglas, 1966, 1970; Hugh-Jones, 1979; Ngubane, 1977; O'neil, 
1990). Furthermore, social constructs and categories inscribed on the body through tattooing, 
adornment, clothing and hairstyles was argued to be associated with placements in the social, political 
and moral worlds of human groups (Alford, 1991; Biedelman, 1968; Boddy, 1988; Holmes, 1979; 
Kennedy, 1970). This increased newfound attention at the time to the social characteristics of the body 
is illustrated by Ellen (1977) who proclaimed that researchers need to acknowledge the 
interdependence and overlapping of the “the cerebral, the material and the social” (370).  
This paradigm shift, however, limited conceptualizing the socialized body to the mere reflection of 
social arrangements and constructs with not much attention to the links between knowledge and 
practice in relation to individual conceptualization of meanings ascribed to bodily practices or the 
relation between body, power and resistance. At the heart of these social problems, in relation to 
conceptualizing the socialized body, is the question of the formation of subjectivity; the juxtaposition 
and overlapping of perception, emotion, desire, judgment, self-placement and self-awareness that shape 
and influence both subjects and their actions. Marleu-Ponty (1962) argues in the Phenomenology of 
Perception that the dualism of the body and the mind is not how humans experience their social world 
and that, instead, we should develop complex, multi-layered and dialectical concepts of social 
consciousness and self-awareness. Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty thinks of the body not as a mere object 
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but rather as an “expressive space” where we can identify meaning and importance of behavior and 
social action (146). Conceptualizing the body as an “expressive space” and identifying embodiment as 
a characteristic of values and meanings bridges the aforementioned gap between thinking of the body 
as a reflection of social arrangements and the formation of subjectivity.  
The work of Merleau-Ponty inspired Pierre Bourdieu to conceptualize the transformation of the 
physical and biological body into a “distinctive body” that could be like “a machine, to be tuned and 
serviced and improved wherever possible” (Benson, 141). Conceptualizing the body as a machine does 
not allude to the employment of biological bodies or bodily symbols by a lucky minority for profit or 
social gains as discussed earlier by Hertz. Instead it highlights the widespread use of the body by a 
majority of people through very specific mechanisms to garner social gains. Essentially this renders the 
body as not just a biological object or as an individual subset of the self but also, and more importantly, 
as a social construct that belongs to both the individual and the society.  
Bourdieu (1991) argues that the body is the “visible manifestation of the person” which includes 
values, character, beliefs and presentation of the self (367). Furthermore, Bourdieu argues that 
manifestations of the body are developed and shaped by “the internalized structures, dispositions, 
tendencies, habits, ways of acting, that are both individualistic and yet typical of one's social group” or 
what he collectively calls “habitus” (Oliver, 114). The notion of habitus is particularly significant in 
addressing the gap between conceptualizing the socialized body and the formation of subjectivity 
because it highlights both the internalization of personal affinities and the social structures that shape it. 
We could, accordingly, not only think of the body as a pool for mining information about social facts or 
internalized meanings of action, which is important, but also as a space where power is exercised, 
grievance is expressed, identity is negotiated and socialization is processed. Michel Foucault (1991), 
looking at the body as a space for exercising power, coined the term biopower to describe the ways by 
which nation states regulate and control their subjects. This is realized through “an explosion of 
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numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of population” 
such as heredity control, public health policies and classifications of both mental and physical illnesses 
(140).  
Several studies, building on the body as a space for both the appropriation and recreation of social 
order, values and knowledge, emerged. For example, Boddy (1989) argues that women in of the 
Hofriyat village in Northern Sudan are made into “living vessels” of their culture's values and beliefs 
through the practice of female genital mutilation (16). Aihwa's (1989) study of female workers in 
Malaysian factories who are allegedly possessed by spirits revealed, however, that through the 
performance of becoming possessed (a bodily affliction) these women are able to protest dire working 
conditions, low pay and sexual harassment without fear of punishment or other negative consequences 
to their livelihood (28-42). Similarly, Abu-Lughod (2002) proposes that the Burqah for Afghani women 
serves as a “portable seclusion” that helps women maintain their society's standards of modesty and, 
thus, their own ability to carry own with daily business (785). In these instances we are presented with 
the employment of the body as a negotiator where the terms of social placement that restricts public 
activities of women are relatively mitigated and lifted in exchange of the recreation of social order and 
moral values through specific codes of dressing.    
3. Pathways to Atheism: Loose Religious Socialization and Apostasy 
While it's quite uncommon and very rare to find an entire family in Egypt with parents who 
consciously raise their children secularly, there are cases where religion is not central to the upbringing 
of children and socializing them. Based on the literature on the relation between socialization, the 
parents' religious orientation and apostasy we already know that predisposition to apostasy or disbelief 
is largely shaped by the level of centrality of religion to the family. Hansberger (1983) stipulates that 
the low significance of religion in socialization and child upbringing is the most significant factor in the 
disposition to apostasy. Accordingly, it's not a surprise that some of my interlocutors reported that they 
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have experienced what I describe as “loose religious socialization” which basically means that religious 
socialization is largely marginalized in the family.  
For instance, Hunter, a medical professional in his mid-thirties, recalls that religion was just not in the 
picture either for him or in the way he was raised. He fasted during Ramadan and occasionally attended 
the Friday prayers but other than that religion was not something his mother spoke off or encouraged 
him to follow despite being a believer herself. Hunter recalls that, in addition to the marginalization of 
religion in his upbringing, he wasn't attached to religion from the start and didn't have a religious zeal 
or interest. Occasionally, and during hardships, Hunter used to pray and thought that going through 
them was a blessing from God but that never materialized into a commitment to religion. Nevertheless, 
he self-identified as a Muslim well into his twenties. There were times when a close relative at his age 
was upset that he didn't pray with him but he recalls that his reluctance to pray was not due to do a 
conscious choice but rather because he “simply didn't feel like it”. Eventually, Hunter adopted a festive 
lifestyle where he would socialize in bars and pubs which involved regular consumption of alcohol and 
premarital sexual relations, both of which are extremely frowned upon and perceived as grave sins by 
Islam. Interestingly, Hunter recalls that his Mother was not the least concerned and not even once 
complained or advised him to change his lifestyle despite knowing about his activities. 
Loose religion socialization, however, doesn't necessarily dictate the ways by which individuals think 
about or express religion. Layth, Hunter's brother, an educator in his early thirties, describes quite a 
different experience. Like Hunter, he recalls that religion was never an important part of his upbringing. 
In fact, Layth recalls that their mother was rather reluctant to teach them about religion and was 
defensive when other members of their family tried to approach them about religion because she was 
afraid that they'd become radicalised. “I was particularly vulnerable to radicalism in my mother's 
perception because I was interested in religion during my childhood”, Layth told me. While Layth was 
not formally educated about religion, other than the classes he attended at school, he would spend time 
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with his grandfather learning how to recite the Qur'an. Unlike Hunter, Layth was more keen on 
performing prayers and observing religious traditions. “I was never conventionally religious. I prayed 
and fasted but also listened to music, watched western movies and played video games. I was also quite 
sceptical of the legitimacy of religious interpretations that were presented in school or in the Friday 
sermons” he explained. Accordingly, Layth thinks that he constructed a peculiar religious identity by 
which he was interested in observing religious rituals but was also at the same time coming up with 
very individual conclusions and ideas about religion. For instance, Layth believed that it was consistent 
with Islam that salvation was not exclusive to Muslims, that women should enjoy absolute equal 
treatment with men and that there should be no limits or constraints on personal liberties based on 
religion. In a sense, Layth's experience breaks away from Hansberger's stipulation that it's highly likely 
that children who are not religiously socialized are more disposed to apostasy. At the same time, 
however, it reveals a different way by which loose religious socialization can influence the religious 
identities of individuals. Loose religious socialization in Layth's case, and instead of turning him to 
apostasy, allowed him a space to form an individualistic understanding of religion that is relatively 
independent and, as we will see later, conflicting with mainstream religious discourse. This conflict, as 
Layth recalled, was one of the most influential gateways to scepticism and eventually abandoning 
religion which indirectly fits with Hansberger's argument since loose religious socialization has 
allowed the possibility of constructing a fundamentally different religious identity from the mainstream 
regardless of whether or not it was maintained. 
To sum up, loose religious socialization in the two cases I've mentioned has allowed two possibilities; 
adopting an “impious” or alternative lifestyle and constructing an individualistic and non-mainstream 
religious identity. I will return back later to the cases of Hunter and Layth and try to explain and 
analyse how eventually their situations developed into a conflict with faith. At this point, however, and 
to further develop my analysis, I will explore a different outcome and possibility of loose religious 
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socialization. Joe, a banker in his late twenties, says that like most upper middle class Egyptians, he 
comes from a “moderately Muslim family” that has strict beliefs and commitment to observing basic 
Islamic rituals such as attending the Friday prayers and fasting. Nevertheless, his family did not 
actively and particularly encourage him to pray and to learn and read the Qur'an. In a sense, to Joe, 
religious socialization was something that is implied and in the “background” rather than being central 
to his upbringing and his every day. While Joe remembers that he felt some pride in his Muslim identity 
he also always felt alienated in the Friday prayers. Joe was upset with what he calls “strong political 
overtones” in the sermons that divided mankind into the camps of believers and heretics who earned 
and deserved God's wrath and damnation. Joe was also dissatisfied with the topics of the sermons for 
what he deemed as “propagation of irrelevant issues when society obviously needs some serious 
reforms”. Most importantly to Joe, however, was a dissatisfaction with religious explanations of the 
world which he thought were “weird stories, absurd supernatural views, historical inaccuracies or 
whichever shit that you hear when you go to a sermon”. Accordingly, as Joe proclaims, because 
religion was not particularly significant in his upbringing, he was already developing negative feelings 
and ideas about religion early on in his childhood. In fact, during the interview, Joe found it very 
difficult to reflect on when and how exactly he started feeling antagonism towards religion. “It's like it 
was almost always this way for me. I just never felt comfortable with religion or with being in a 
mosque” Joe told me. Simultaneously, Joe was interested in non-theistic and scientific explanations of 
the natural world such as the theory of Evolution. Interestingly, however, that was well-before he self-
identified as an atheist or decided that he had abandoned religion. Joe recalls that science was, at some 
point, “definitely a strong factor” in abandoning religion and faith in God. “The world made more 
sense to me than before” Joe said to me. Nevertheless, exposure to scientific explanations of the world 




There are two observations to make at this point. First, Joe's case, once again, exemplifies a position 
where loose religious socialization opens possibilities of alternative ways of thinking and perceiving 
the world. Second, like Hunter and Layth, there seems to be a readily available alternative avenues, 
values and world-views that both shapes and accommodates the different ways to think or behave. 
Additionally, pertaining to the second observation, Layth's account on his mother's concerns about him 
potentially becoming radicalised if he is exposed to religion raises an extremely significant question; 
what cultural motives was behind their mother's concerns and, equally as important, what other 
alternatives did his mother approach in socializing and upbringing him if not based on religion? Layth's 
account of his mother's concerns, Joe's turn to scientific explanations of the world and Hunter's access 
to clubs and bars highlights the need to consider the broader sociocultural context of upper middle class 
Egyptians and its impact on the levels and intensity of religious socialization. 
To sum up this section we can make the following argument, loose religious socialization predisposes 
individuals to apostasy by two means. Firstly, by allowing the possibility of adopting alternative 
lifestyles that doesn't comply with religion. Secondly, by allowing a space for individuals to develop 
ideas and world-views that are independent from mainstream religious discourses. Since predisposition 
doesn't imply necessity, loose religious socialization, despite being a significant variable, cannot solely 
explain transformation into atheism. This is particularly because, through examining the accounts of 
my interlocutors, it has become clear that influences outside the family need to be accounted for. For 
example, the availability of avenues where alternative lifestyles can be adopted and practised and the 
pervasive influence of ideas and values that made my interlocutors feel uncomfortable with mainstream 
religious discourses. 
4. Pathways to Atheism: Moderate Religious Socialization and Apostasy 
If indeed children are more likely to follow the orientation of their parents especially if religion is 
central to socialization and upbringing, how do we understand the other cases of my interlocutors who 
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have reported that their parents were keen on socializing them religiously? This is perhaps an 
opportunity to once again stress on the overlapping and multiplicity of variables and reasons my 
interlocutors have abandoned religion. It could also be the case that significance of religious 
socialization was overemphasized in past studies or is diminished in different contexts. Moreover, it's 
an invitation to problematize “religious socialization” as a categorical unit of analysis as it is clearly 
plausible to speculate that religious socialization varies in intensity and approach from one case to the 
other. For the purpose of this research I use the category of “moderate religious socialization” to 
describe the centrality of religion in socialization through active encouragement to observe religious 
rituals and traditions however without violence or intense conflicts. It seems, at least from my 
encounter with my sample, that it's more common for atheists to have experienced religious 
socialization rather than not.  
For instance, Helios, an engineer in his early twenties, recalls that his parents hired a sheikh to teach 
him about religion and how to cite the Qur'an which implies that, despite not being uncommon, his 
family went an extra mile to socialize him religiously. Additionally, his family also actively encouraged 
him to perform the five daily prayers and to attend the Friday sermons and prayers. Based on the 
literature on religious socialization, we should be able to speculate that, with such emphasis on religion, 
Helios is unlikely to be predisposed to apostasy. However, Helios recalls that he was actually not 
religious at all during his early childhood and teenage years. For instance, Helios says that he would 
run away from the lessons of the sheikh his parents hired. While this may seem and could simply be a 
child trying to escape a chore to do more interesting and fun activities, Helios recalls that he was 
agitated from the Qur'anic verses the sheikh was instructing him. For example, Helios says he never 
quite understood even as a child why, as per Islamic Shariah, inheritance is not divided equally among 
men and women. Early on in his childhood, Helios seems to have possessed a sense of scepticism 
towards religion and disconnection from its rituals. This feeling persisted in his high school years when 
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his best friend, who was religious, took him to prayers. “I never used to feel anything and didn't know 
why” Helios recalls. Nevertheless, Helios says that he continued to observe performing the prayers, at 
least occasionally, to please his parents and “because it was what he was supposed to do”.  During his 
college days, Helios travelled to perform Omra with his mother hoping to reconnect with religion in the 
holiest of places in Islam. “I sincerely did everything I was supposed to do and still didn't feel anything. 
The idea that Islam is a valid religion started crumbling” he told me. Helios's account seems to imply 
that, despite the significance of religion to his family, he experienced a disconnection from religion 
early on in his childhood. It's interesting that Helios cited an internalization of a conflict between his 
values, as for example equality for women, and what he was being taught by mainstream religious 
discourse whether in school, the mosque or the sheikh. We are accordingly, once again, incited to 
investigate the influence of alternative value systems and beliefs that, in the case of Helios, seemed to 
override religious socialization. 
Similarly, Alison, a teacher in her thirties, experienced a sense of disconnection from religion later on 
in her life. Alison comes from what she calls a “conventional” Egyptian family that encouraged her to 
be a “good Muslim” which to her family meant to observe religious rituals such as fasting and praying 
as well as wearing the veil. By the time Alison was 18 she got veiled, performed the five daily prayers, 
memorized the Qur'an and joined religion lessons in a nearby mosque. Alison recalls that her religiosity 
was stemmed from a need to “find some peace of mind” as well as a sense of obligation to pleasing her 
parents. Being a “meticulous perfectionist”, as Alison describes herself, she often found herself under 
pressure to “do everything right”. Accordingly, she started feeling tired and mentally exhausted instead 
of relief. As she turned twenty she went with her family to Mekka to perform Omra in a bid to reignite 
her commitment to religiosity but instead felt “suffocated and disconnected” throughout her time in 
Saudi Arabia to the extent that she was counting the days to get back to Egypt. When she came back to 
Egypt she recalls that she was doing a lot of effort to be closer to God but it felt to her that she was in a 
31 
 
“one sided relation”. “I was not getting anything in return. This effort made me even more anxious and 
dissatisfied” Alison told me. One day Alison was praying and while in the middle of prayers she 
suddenly unfolded the rug and asked herself “what am I doing?” and she never prayed again since that 
day. It wasn't until she abandoned religion that Alison started questioning Qur'anic verses, people's 
beliefs and world views. Alison says that she felt that the scripture didn't make any sense and wasn't 
speaking to her to the point that she was questioning how she got immersed in religion in the first 
place. “We are asked to care for the most mundane of things. Why does God care if I cover my foot or 
not while I am praying? This makes no sense at all” Alison said to me. Once again based on the 
literature we should speculate that the centrality of religion to her family and her religious socialization 
would lead her to become immersed in religion. However, on the contrary, becoming strictly religious 
was the undoing of her belief and seems to be the source of disconnection from religion. However, 
“disconnection” from religion seems to be quite abrupt to be an explanation for radically shifting gears 
from observing piety and immersion in religion to flat out disbelief and atheism. There are two clues 
that Alison alluded to in our conversation. First, the disconnection that she felt was a result from “not 
having a peace of mind” despite strictly following and observing religious rituals and tradition. Second, 
Alison proclaims that the “first order of business” once she abandoned religion was to take of the veil 
and “pursue the things that really made me happy and satisfied”. For example, shortly after Alison 
decided she was no longer going to adopt a religious lifestyle, she formed a rock band and started 
performing in concerts. This may seem like a radical shift, and indeed it is, however, the question is; 
had Alison been, perhaps unconsciously, bottling her desires and interests in compliance with her 
family's religious socialization? If this is the case, it could be an explanation to the seemingly abrupt 
“disconnection” from religion and the radical change in her lifestyle. But even if that is the case, where 
did this come from or, in other words, what is it that has eventually overridden her religious 
socialization? Alison has recalled that while her parents actively encouraged her to be a “good Muslim” 
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they also allowed her to own American pop music cassettes, hang posters of boy bands in her room and 
hang out with her female friends without supervision in malls and sport clubs. What I am alluding to, 
once again, is that while religious socialization is important, it also often becomes diminished in the 
face of other influences and particularly the consumption of cultural products such as arts and the 
exposure to alternative world-views and value systems. 
So far we've observed that moderate religious socialization could sometimes be overridden by 
alternative values, as in the case of Helios, or by the lure of an alternative lifestyle, as in the case with 
Alison. We've also observed that there is a significant need to consider these powerful influences that 
come from outside the family's desire to socialize their children religiously.  
Eric, an entrepreneur in his early twenties who was born into Christianity, had a similar experience of 
disconnection from religion. However, to Eric, the gateway to apostasy apparently started for material 
reasons rather than spiritual ones. Eric holds a dual nationality with an Arab country where he spent 
most of his childhood before he came back to Egypt in his early teenage years. During his childhood he 
became involved with church activities and by the time his stay outside Egypt ended he was part of a 
church choir as well as an acting group. Eric's family encouraged his commitment to church activities 
as they were quite invested in religion themselves. At the height of his religiosity early in his teenage 
years, Eric joined a retreat with his young church group where they played games and attended 
sermons. The retreat was designed as some sort of a rite of passage where youngsters are encouraged to 
be “true believers” and not just Christians by name. The central theme of the retreat was to commit to 
being “a good Christian” and observe the example of Jesus in everything they do in their daily lives and 
particularly to obey their parents and not slur or cheat. Eric recalls that this retreat made him feel 
“filthy” and in need of repentance which reignited his commitment to religion and being a good 
Christian. At the age of 16 Eric wanted, pretty much like most upper middle class Egyptians, to have a 
mobile phone and a PC which his family was reluctant to buy. Eric, being a “good Christian”, prayed to 
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God to give him the things that he wanted but to no avail. Unsatisfied with God's “negligence” of his 
prayers, he expressed his frustration to his priest who told him that “God is not an ATM machine” and 
that God always has a hidden wisdom that he should look for and observe. Eric, dissatisfied with his 
priest's answer, started growing scepticism towards the nature of God who doesn't answer the prayers 
of his followers whether for the mundane material things or serious life afflictions such as disease. This 
led him to question one of the most basic tenets of Christianity; the original sin. “Why have I 
descended to Earth and have not been given a chance like Adam? Who is to say that I would not have 
acted differently and why should I be treated with a punishment for a sin that I've not done?” Eric 
recalled his line of thought. Eric's case displays an interesting dilemma where, if we were to reconstruct 
his account, becoming a good pious Christian didn't seem to warrant the rewards he expected and, 
accordingly, he grew sceptical to religion upon which he later started questioning the tenets and beliefs 
of Christianity. The question is, however, what could account for Eric's apparent pragmatism? 
Furthermore, could we explain Eric's case purely on individual qualities? Indeed, Eric doesn't recall 
that he had experienced any problems with religious values or beliefs prior to this incident. We could 
speculate that Eric's dissatisfaction with religion is merely symptomatic to underlining variables and 
particularly the desire, similar to most upper middle class Egyptians children, to own gadgets and the 
expectations children have from their parents when they comply with their desires and beliefs. In other 
words, while Eric maybe a pragmatic person as he describes himself, the consumption of expensive 
goods and gadgets which is a staple for upper middle class Egyptian families seems to be the 
overarching stimulant of Eric's conversion. Eric also questioned his religious beliefs and, therefore, I 
am not making the point that Eric turned to apostasy because he failed to acquire material goods but 
rather that religious socialization in this particular case failed to offer incentives for the observance of 
religious rituals and piety. In fact, upon further digging, this was a spiritual conflict at heart because as 
I've mentioned earlier, Eric felt that the doctrine of the original sin implied that he was “filthy” and 
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devalued as a human being. Furthermore, as Eric recalled, he was taught that, regardless of how “good” 
he is, he will always be a sinner in the eyes of God and that only Christ's sacrifice can redeem him. 
Perhaps it was this feeling of worthlessness rather than pragmatism that incited him to eventually turn 
to apostasy as he was unable to reap neither spiritual fulfilment nor material rewards from his parents 
despite his commitment to the church. 
To sum up this section, it appears that moderate religious socialization in the family, while most 
certainly significant, is embattled with outside influences that, when internalized, they may potentially 
override it. The most significant manifestation of this tension is the sense of “disconnection” from 
religion that my interlocutors have reported despite the centrality of religion in their families and their 
immersion in religious rituals and observance of tradition. Therefore, while Hansberger's argument may 
account as to why atheism is uncommon in Egypt, since religious socialization is indeed pervasive and 
widespread in Egypt, it doesn't explain why individuals coming from fairly religious families have 
transformed into atheism. Furthermore, so far at least, it seems that Caplovitz and Sherrow's stipulation 
that poor parental relations, neurosis, radical political orientation and commitment to intellectualism 
predispose individuals to apostasy could not be substantiated through the experiences of my 
interlocutors. On the contrary, all of my interlocutors so far have actually spoken in favour of their 
relations with their parents and have not expressed the slightest interest in politics or intellectualism at 
least at the time they were still committed to religion. These accounts highlight the need to consider 
other variables that shape identity and religiosity outside the family if we are to reach a better 
understanding of atheism as a social experience in Egypt.    
5. Pathways to Atheism: Cultural Embodiment and Resistance 
So far I've presented cases where religious socialization, despite the varying levels of significance, has 
not incited or sparked significant conflicts or tension between my interlocutors and their parents. All 
the cases that I've examined up to this point have demonstrated that they were either not interested in 
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religion to begin with or that they were, more or less, immersed in it themselves. The latter cases 
particularly have reported positive parental relations and highlighted a sense of “disconnection” as the 
main cause of their apostasy, which as I've argued needs to be examined further through variables other 
than the family's influence. I've encountered two cases, however, where the enforcement of religious 
socialization has not only sparked tension within the family but may have also directly contributed to 
the transformation into atheism.  
For instance, Grace, a saleswoman in her late twenties, recalls that she was constantly under pressure 
from her family early in her childhood to be a “good Muslim”. What that meant at this early age for a 
female child was to pray, fast, wear modest attire and obey her parents. Nonetheless, Grace said that 
despite her parents’ wishes for her, she was never comfortable with religion whether in the classes she 
attended at school or at home. Furthermore, despite the encouragement from her parents and the 
requirements of school curricula, she particularly refused to memorize Qur'anic verses. Grace couldn't 
frame why exactly she felt this way towards religion because, as she puts it, “it happened a life time 
ago”. However, given the immense pressure from her family, her feelings and actions even at this early 
age could be perceived as some kind of unconscious resistance to adopt a lifestyle she wasn't attracted 
to. In fact, this speculation seems to be more plausible based on later developments as her body began 
to mature after puberty. As expected and enforced on most Muslim girls hitting the age of puberty in 
Egypt, Grace wore the veil upon uncompromising demands from her parents who wanted her to be a 
“good Muslim woman”. Grace recalled that she wore the veil on-and-off with each time signifying 
important underlining assumptions and processes that we need to consider and examine. Let's start with 
the beginning; why is it that her parents insisted that she wears the veil right after she reached puberty? 
In her parent’s perception, as Grace proposes, that was a necessary obligation and a definitive 
requirement for becoming “a good Muslim woman”. In a sense, wearing the veil serves as a rite of 
passage into “womanhood” that doesn't only symbolize piety but also the acceptance of social 
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regulations and restrictions on sexuality. This is remarkably similar to Boddy's study on women in the 
Hofriyat village in Northern Sudan where he argues that cultural values, social order and beliefs are 
embodied through the practice of female circumcision. The implications and symbolism of wearing the 
veil, as Grace says, is something that she was very aware of and “loathed” which put her in a fierce 
tension with her family when she decided to take it off during high school. Furthermore, Grace insisted 
that she on buying and wearing clothes that her parents deemed were “inappropriate”. In response her 
parents would tear, burn and throw away her clothes in a bid to force her to comply with their 
perception of the Islamic standards of women's attire. Additionally, her parents continuously grounded 
her so as long as she insisted on “going out indecently” according to Grace's recollection of their 
arguments. What we are being presented here is a case where the body is a significant frontier both 
social regulation, the embodiment of culture and resistance. Perhaps it’s through Grace's experience 
that we could also understand why Alison, in her turn, immediately took the veil off once she started 
having doubts in religion well ahead of adopting an alternative lifestyle or turning to atheism. On a 
similar note, Layth recalled that he was dismayed by the negative categorization of his mother's piety 
and moral fabric, according to mainstream religious discourse, because she didn't wear the veil. In a 
sense, Layth's increasing alienation from mainstream religious discourse that incited him to develop his 
own understanding of religion and his later turn to atheism could be perceived, at least partially, as an 
intellectual and emotional resistance to society's projection of its values and standards on his mother's 
body. Interestingly, however, Grace says that she, with her own accordance, wore the veil once more 
when she joined college. “Putting on the veil enabled me a significant freedom away from my parents 
restrictions who would have otherwise expected me to come back home right after I finished my 
lectures in college” Grace recalls. Therefore, in a sense, what Grace is saying is that while she didn't 
want to conform to “appropriate Islamic clothing” she nonetheless identified within it a lease on greater 
freedom which operates similarly to the concept of “portable seclusion” that Abu-Lughod proposes in 
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her study on the Burqah and Afghani women. Relating that to transforming into atheism; I am not 
suggesting, nor did Grace, that the battle over her body is what caused her to become atheist but rather 
that it was a significant experience that may have influenced her later on. In fact, Grace attributes her 
atheism to a traumatizing experience during her days in college. On one fateful day Grace took a cab 
and was on her way to visit a friend when the cab driver drove her to a remote area and started 
assaulting and sexually harassing her. When Grace resisted the cab driver he took out a knife and 
threatened to kill her if she doesn't do what he pleases and ordered her to “suck his dick”. He took her 
to an empty building under construction and forced her to do what he wanted. After keeping her for a 
couple of hours he made her take off her clothes and tried to penetrate her. Grace's resistance made 
matters worse and was met with severe beating. Grace's attempts to reason with the cab driver where to 
no avail but her resistance prevented the cab driving from being able to penetrate her. In the process 
Grace says she lost her virginity as the cab driver penetrated her vagina with his fingers. In the end of 
the ordeal the cab driver took off and left her in the building shaken and traumatized. Grace reflected 
on her experience and recalled praying to God as the rape was happening and was angry on what she 
perceived as God's abstaining from saving her at the time. “I was told that this was a trial from God but 
I was skeptical of this explanation. Why would God test me when he already knows the results of this 
test? Why does an all knowing God want to test me? It was over for me” Grace told me. However, a 
question begs an answer; why did Grace become atheist as a result of this ordeal? Could she have 
reacted differently given that some other individuals' ordeals serve to reinforce their beliefs rather than 
shake them? In fact, while Grace was angry with God and skeptical of his existence after this ordeal, 
she didn't completely lose faith until she started conversing with an atheist friend over the Internet 
about her ordeals and ideas which, after sometime, materialized in atheism. At the same time her earlier 
experience and desires to adopt an alternative lifestyle other than that of the “good Muslim” were both 
justified and amplified. There are three points to be made that could develop our understanding of 
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Grace's turn to atheism. First, once again, we are presented with an outside influence, in this case 
conversing over the Internet, as a pivotal point on a pathway to atheism. Second, we need to account 
for, and hence investigate, the allurement and even there mere existence of potential alternative 
lifestyles that hindered cultural embodiment and interrupted religious socialization from taking its 
course. Third, Grace's ordeal highlights that understanding transformations into atheism must, when 
appropriate, account for significant individual and critical life experiences. 
Most studies on cultural embodiment and resistance in Muslim societies is primarily focused on women 
and piety (Abu-Lughod ; 2002, Deeb; 2006, Hafez; 2011, Mahmood; 2005). However, as Foucault 
argues, biopower or the subjugation and control of the population through their bodies is socially 
universal and cross-gendered. Regulation and cultural embodiment, as it relates to religious 
socialization, is manifested in Jackson's case, a 19 years old college student, who faced a similar 
situation as that of Grace with her family. “Religion is central to my family and I was strongly 
encouraged to perform religious rituals, not to do wrong things such as smoking or lying and to take 
God in account with everything I do” Jackson said.”  At the age of 15, when Jackson was at the 
epitome of his religiosity, he encountered a family friend, whom he later found out was atheist, and 
discussed his beliefs with him. “These discussions made me curios and sceptical and so I decided to 
start researching the question of God's existence online. After a short while I started to identify with 
atheism and joined a closed Facebook group for atheists that further reinforced my scepticism” Jackson 
told me. When his family found out about his ideas, a tension quickly rose and he was in daily conflicts 
with his family who tried to change to his mind. Furthermore, Jackson's uncle took him to a psychiatrist 
and was prescribed anti-depressants and other medicine to “cure atheism”. It's quite grimly revealing 
that Jackson's family would associate doubts in religion with mental illness or that a professional 
psychiatrist would, accordingly, attempt to “cure” it with medicine. Similarly to the battle over Grace's 
body, we are presented with a deeply pervasive and radical manifestation of the length “safeguarding” 
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religious system could go through practices on the body. While Grace's case presented the enforcement 
of cultural embodiment through the regulation of attire and Boddy's study on Northern Sudanese 
women presented it through bodily alterations by the practice of female genital mutilation, Jackson's 
experience with his psychiatrist introduces medical practice and authority as a medium by which 
biopower is exercised. In a sense, the medical professional in the white coat was an agent of the 
overarching repressive sociocultural and political agenda against anyone who, for one reason or the 
other, left the confines of the “safety of the kettle”. Jackson, under pressure from his family, took the 
pills but felt that he wasn't sick to be cured in the first place and that religion simply stopped making 
sense to him. The pressure from his family did not make him revert to Islam but rather pushed him to 
question it even more, become hostile towards its values and further develop his scepticism into 
atheism. The significance of Jackson's experience is that it, once again, highlights influence outside of 
the family and particularly his membership in an atheist group on Facebook. Additionally, like in all the 
cases that I've encountered, it challenges the presumption that individuals with loose significant 
socialization are more likely to become apostates. On the contrary, for Jackson and others, religious 
socialization was overridden by other influences, personal experiences and critical life events. In fact, 
only three of my nine interlocutors have claimed that religion was not central to their family with one 
of them, Layth, developing his own individualistic understanding of religion rather than directly 
transforming into atheism. However, I am not stipulating that religious socialization is not significant 
but rather that, as a unit of analysis, it offers an incomplete picture and explanation of the formation of 
atheist identities. The significance of Jackson's case is that, similar to Grace, poor parental relations 
could be, at least case by case, considered for being a variable in the pathway to atheism as Caplovitz 
and Sherrow have argued. This is, however, not to say that positive parental relations necessarily 
implies that children would follow their parent's religious orientations. In fact, as I will discuss later, 
positive parental relations was capitalized by many of interlocutors to assert their atheism to their 
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families despite experiencing moderate and significant religious socialization.   
To sum up this section we can make a few observations about the mechanisms by which strict religious 
socialization operates and is resisted. Firstly, strict religious socialization, more strikingly than other 
levels of intensity, involves a significant and an uncompromising enforcement of cultural embodiment. 
Second, while bodily regulation is an avenue of religious socialization it is, also, an avenue through 
which resistance is expressed and restrictions on behaviour is negotiated. Thirdly, strict religious 
socialization, as with other levels of intensity, could also be overridden and challenged by influences 
outside the family where, at least, alternative lifestyles and ideas could be imagined and aspired to. 
Finally, while social research often motivates us, at least unconsciously, to focus on social issues, 
variables and units of analysis, we should also be careful not to overlook critical life events and 
individual experiences that may influence and develop the pathways to atheism. 
6. Religion: Reciprocity and Subjugation  
Embracing religion entails acceptance of restrictions, regulations and observance of rituals. Religion as 
evident in the accounts of my interlocutors, however, is not a one-sided relation. Many of my 
interlocutors have reported a struggle with a sense of disconnection from religion after, one way or the 
other, failing to harvest expected gains from observing religion. Based on my interviews I can divide 
these expectations into two categories; a functional and grounded world-view and personal support.  
By world-view I mean a cognitive predisposition that is based on a body of knowledge towards 
morality, social order, metaphysics, socioeconomic arrangements, world affairs and conceptions of 
universal truths. Foucault (1976) argues that each society has its own “regime of truth” which 
encompasses “the types of discourse society harbours and causes to function as true” (112). 
Accordingly, the “regime of truth” establishes, through religion among other institutions and 
mechanisms, world-views that reproduces and maintains the power relations that establish it. I will 
reserve further discussion on conceptualizing religion as a discourse for the following chapter after 
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accounting for competing and overlapping discourses. At this point, however, it’s important to 
highlight that establishing regimes of truth, partially through religion, doesn’t move in one direction. In 
other words, if for one reason or the other the regime of truth becomes irrelevant, escapable or 
questioned, religion by extension may also be caught in the crossfire.  
Personal support, as the second outcome of the reciprocal relation with religion, encompasses social, 
spiritual and financial rewards that are perceived to be deserved for both believing and behaving 
accordingly. For example, Alisson expressed that despite a great effort in diligently behaving as 
required, she didn’t experience a “peace of mind”. Similarly, Helios expressed his frustration with 
constantly not “feeling anything” despite observing religious rituals and consciously embarking on an 
endeavour to experience spirituality. On another note, Eric was disappointed that obeying his parents 
and his commitment to the church was not translated into acquiring the gadgets he wanted from neither 
his parents nor God. Grace’s account for her rape ordeal and her scepticism of God’s existence after it 
happened reveals that to her having faith was expected to warrant a protection from God. All these 
accounts highlight the reciprocal nature of the relation between religion and believers that may largely 
undermine individual attitude and commitment to religion if not maintained. In other words, we can 
partially think of atheism as a possible development of the failed fulfilment of reciprocal claims and 
perceived entitlements by committed believers.  
Our discussion on analysing the religious experience as partially a reciprocal relationship also invokes 
a discussion on regulation and control. Religion offers its adherents an encompassing world-view, an 
identity and group membership. At the same time it devises elaborate techniques of punishment and 
regulation that bestows its instilment and formation of subjectivity with the necessary arsenal to 
maintain and reproduce the regime of truth that a given society adopts. Grace’s account of her family’s 
severe backlash when she refused to comply with their desired standards of “proper” attire invokes us 
to think of the family as an agent of the state and the larger social order. Consider the incidents where 
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Grace’s family exercised pressure by burning and cutting her clothes as well as financially constricting 
over her taste in clothing. Similarly, Jackson’s family inclination to conceive his atheism as a mental 
illness and seeking a cure through medical intervention pinpoints that religion transcends the functional 
role of establishing individual belief systems towards a much broader and invasive role in relation to 
the organization of the public sphere. It’s precisely at such conflicts that the family’s role as a 
functional reincarnation of the state and a vanguard of the regime of truth is explicitly manifested. 
Consequently, we are inclined to conceptualize religion as not merely a system of belief and symbols as 
Geertz proposed but also as an institution that is part and parcel of the larger social and political 
context. Accordingly, we can also partially conceptualize manifestations of impiety, irreligion, and by 
extension, atheism as, at least, implicit resistance to terms of social placement, the regime of truth and 
biopower.    
7. Concluding Remarks 
Religious socialization, as observed in all of the cases I've examined, was overpowered by the outside 
influences such as the appeal of alternative lifestyles and values. Additionally, religious socialization 
was challenged within the family as a result of critical life event as well as resistance to control and 
regulation. Furthermore, and more importantly, we are incited to think of religious socialization in 
ways that take in consideration the reach and internalization of globalization to account for the 
accommodation of consumption of western cultural products in both socialization and the daily lives of 
upper middle class Egyptian families. In other words, I am arguing that the while the significance of 
religious socialization may predispose children to holding their parents religious views, this argument 
falls short in explaining apostasy cases where religion was central in socialization. This is primarily 
because religious socialization varies in intensity and also due to the unaccounted outside cultural 
influences that may or may not override it. Conversely, it seems that religious socialization, at least in 
some cases, incites a different outcome than the desired observance of religious standards for behaviour 
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and establishing a religious identity. This seems to be the case particularly when individuals express 
interest and desire in adopting an alternative lifestyle that is shaped by the imagination of other 
possibilities of experiencing life. This could be due to other cultural influences and the imbrication of 
religious socialization, consumption of western cultural products, bilingual education and exposure to 
avenues for alternative lifestyles that are abundant in Egypt. Therefore, a closer examination of the 
broader culture and particularly the implications of globalization is due to further understand my 












































The first observation from studying the cases of my interlocutors so far is that there is not one single 
variables that shapes pathways to atheism but rather an assortment of variables that when combined 
reverting from religion and losing faith becomes a possibility. In the previous chapter I've begun to 
explore my interlocutors' pathways to atheism and particularly the role of religious socialization within 
the family in the formation of atheist identities. I have accounted for the different levels of religion's 
centrality to socialization in my interlocutors' families as well as the implications of these differences 
on how they formed ideas and emotions that shaped their attitudes towards religion. Furthermore, I've 
established that, when appropriate, we must also account for critical life events that may render atheism 
as not merely a social experience born out of broad social variables but also as an individualistic 
experience. Upon further examination there seems to be a common pattern in most of the cases I've 
looked at it which is not being to locate and accommodate individual values acquired within 
mainstream Islamic discourse as well as the appeal and, more importantly, the availability, of 
alternative lifestyles and ideas. This situation led some of my interviewees to a crisis of faith that was 
further reinforced by exposure to information and debates on Islam. Consequently, it's crucial to 
investigate how mainstream and alternative value systems/world-views are constructed and also why 
alternative lifestyles are available to begin with. After all, and despite religious socialization, alternative 
ideas and lifestyles are potentially pervasive to the extent that they may override the religious identity 
inherited from the family. While this chapter will closely examine these variables, we can make a 
preliminary argument; Egypt allows access to alternative lifestyles and ideas partially due to the 
organic diversity within the Egyptian culture as well as the ease of access to information that the 
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Internet and bilingual education enables for upper middle class Egyptians. In this chapter I will attempt 
to identify patterns in the stories told by my interlocutors that could, more or less, determine some 
pathways to atheism in relation to the broader culture and the implications of globalization. This 
analysis will be centered around the literature and studies on globalization and cyberspace in relation to 
the construction of cultural value systems and the formation of identities. 




Cultural anthropology since its development has been occupied with studying the social, cultural and 
economic characteristics within societies that are bound by these boarders and territories. Consequently, 
culture has been represented as a distinctive and an isolated amalgamation of experiences, 
environments, histories, structures, values, beliefs, social relations and economic arrangements forming 
a closed, unique and specific system. The interdependence of global economy, transnational migration 
as well as the technological advancements in transportation and communication that intensified in the 
early 20th century increasingly blurred these boarders and obscured the presupposed uniqueness of 
different cultures. Globalization, accordingly, could be conceptualized as the “social, cultural, 
economic and demographic processes that takes place within nations but also transcends them” (Basch, 
11-12). Conceptualizing globalization has impacted anthropological theories and epistemological 
categories by breaking away from territorial and inherently specific understanding of culture and the 
different human experiences in the world (Kearney, 549).  
This change in anthropological conceptualization of culture is owed to two major culturally 
overreaching developments in the modern global world. First, as the International Labor Organization 
reported in 1991, there were 100 million people who have been displaced and scattered outside their 
countries of origin due to conflicts, wars and poverty (A6). In effect, King (1991) argues that “culture 
has becomes increasingly deterritorialized” as more anthropologists became aware that millions of 
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people are no longer connected to their soil and neatly constructed boarders. In a sense, viewing the 
world as a mosaic of separate and impenetrable cultures was no longer coherent and consistent, if it 
ever was, with the facts of transnational employment and population displacement that highlighted the 
development of an increasingly global world (Gupta and Ferguson, 7). Second, the deep and 
accelerated speed of the flow of information, ideas, images and arts has profound implications on the 
cultural traits of the presumably still bounded populations and groups. Sociocultural anthropological 
literature, recognizing the impact of the wild flow of culture, began conceptualizing themes and 
intellectual frameworks that could account for the diffusion and amalgamation of different cultures.  
These changes in conceptualization of culture resonated, furthermore, with the ways by which identity 
is understood and approached. Cultural hybridity (Bhabha; 1994), rhizome (Deleuze and Guatarri; 
1987) and creolisation (Hannerz; 1992) are all concepts that all, more or less, propose that that are 
forms and manifestations of culture that are not historically or geographically rooted. Instead they are a 
result of exposure to globalization whose reach is identified by consumption of cultural products, 
overseas employment and displacement. Bhabha argues that, when contrasted with the givens of 
cultural hybridity, “essentialist claims for the inherent authenticity or purity of cultures which, when 
inscribed in the naturalistic sign of symbolic consciousness frequently become political arguments for 
the hierarchy and ascendary of powerful cultures” (83). Bhabha's argument pinpoints the implication of 
conceptualizing cultural hybridity on not only our understanding of the concept of culture but also 
identity politics.  
For instance, Ong (1993) studies Chinese overseas workers who increasingly “call into question not 
only stability in cultural identity, but also ties to a single nation state, or even to a single imagined 
community” (745-778). Cultural hybridity also has significant implications on our understanding of the 
formation of identity and the ways by which it is manifested and expressed. Traditionally, anthropology 
and ethnographic typologies followed a strict classification and categorization system that is 
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necessarily binary where individuals either are members of a group, nation and a cultural unit or not 
(Kearney, 558). Instead, Kearney (1995) proposes to replace the “either-or classification” with the 
“logic of both-and-and in which the subjects share partial and overlapping identities” (ibid). In effect, 
many anthropological studies and ethnographic literature conceptualized identity as a synthesis of 
overlapping variables such as political forces, cultures, contexts and socioeconomic statuses that are 
more elusive and flexible.  
For example, Sherine Hafez (2011) argues that the divide between Islam and secularism/modernity is 
forced and one that needs to be avoided. Instead she suggests that both Islam and modernity are 
imbricated in a way that it is almost meaningless to speak of a dichotomy of values and that, in a sense, 
Islam and modernity don't only coexist but are also essential to one another. Hafez's research on Al-
Hilal movement which is an organization run by women in Egypt highlights the complexity of identity 
formation away from the binaries of Islam (or even Islamism) and modernity. Women in Al-Hilal 
organization provide services for women such as day care, Islamic fiqh and literacy classes alongside 
other activities that aim to improve the economic conditions of impoverished women. Hafez's main 
goal is to try to identify the processes that “shape, shift, incite, and produce the desires and 
subjectivities of women in Islamic movements” (5). After all the claim for cultural specificity, as per 
traditional Islamic discourse which sees women as deficient and incapable compared to men, is 
challenged by such activism where women are actively impacting their society. The predicament is that 
there is no predicament since, as Hafez demonstrates, Al-Hilal women are engaged in a daily 
interactive and complex negotiation over Islamic, national and secular identities, discourses and 
methods (8). For example, while Al-Hilal women are sympathetic with an Islamic transformation of 
society they also insist that politics and religion ought to be separated which is an ultimately a secular 
value. Moreover, Al-Hilal women are engaged in structural arrangements and methods of activism that 




Anthropological research on cyberspaces is still in its infancy. Recently, however, the exploding 
popularity of social networking and social media websites among hundreds of millions of users 
worldwide has drawn the attention of many scholars to investigate cyberspace as a potentially 
legitimate research field. After all, even if accessed remotely or anonymously, the internet has 
undeniably become a medium of some kind of social interaction through which some areas of studies in 
the physical world could also be pursued in cyberspace. Several university courses and anthropological 
literature that have already identified cyberspace as a legitimate research site are emerging wildly and 
swiftly. For instance, Daniel Miller (2014) argues in Tales from Facebook that social media websites 
have profound impacts on its users lives' such as cultivating relationships, breaking up marriages, 
devastating privacy and breaking isolation, to name a few. As equally important, Miller also examines 
the impact of social media on society through, for example, activism, online church activities and 
online commerce. However, for cyberspace to indeed be a legitimate field site, there are two basic 
questions that anthropologists investigating cyberspace need to answer. First, can we think of online 
social networking as communities by which we can extend familiar and innovative sociocultural 
analysis? Second, is indeed our online self-presentations consistent with who we are offline or are they 
fabrications and fantasies? As with the case of the human experience in the physical offline world, 
answers to such questions are elusive. Before the explosion of internet use and access, Sherry Turkle 
argues in The Second Self, published in 1984, that computers for adults and college students are a 
“catalyst for cultural formation” or in other words a medium of self-reflection and a lens through which 
others and life is perceived (156). In other words, for Turkle, the computer is not merely part of the 
physical world but also essentially a part of ourselves. This is primarily due to the computer's 
involvement with our everyday psychological lives where the computer, to fend loneliness and 
emptiness, is “a companion without emotional demands” where “you can interact, but never feel 
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vulnerable to another person” (297). Seemingly with the widespread access to online social 
networking, fending off vulnerability to other people seems an unrealistic aspect of our relations with 
the computer. Turkle addresses this development in Alone Together, published in 2011, where she 
argues that online connectivity allows individuals to create and present an alternative reality of 
themselves or life that is “true in simulation” (153). In other words, for Turkle, the advent of online 
social networking hasn't interrupted the refuge we seek in computers but rather buffed it by creating 
alternative realities through which we can project fantasies of ourselves and escape from our 
frustrations. There are other scholars, however, who don't necessarily share Turkle's essentialist 
psychoanalysis of online activity and, instead, look for ways by which people online establish 
meaningful social relations. As mentioned earlier, Miller has examined ways by which Facebook could 
break isolation and allow people to reinforce their relations who would be otherwise disconnected due 
to illnesses, shyness, distances and time constraints. Keenan and Shiri (2008) argue that Facebook 
encourages sociability and interaction amongst its users by allowing them to restrict access to their 
profiles. This, the authors argue, creates a “familiar, private and safe” environment since Facebook 
users have the option to simply take social connections and networks in their physical world to their 
accounts. Dmitri Williams (2006) who studied interaction among players of World of Warcraft, a 
massive multiplayer online game, notes that for some players connection to the game servers and 
participating in game mechanics and objectives allowed them to get in touch with players from various 
backgrounds and identities in ways that may not be readily possible in the physical world (352). This, 
according to one of Williams' interlocutors, enables him to find people with common interests, inside 
and outside the game, whereas in the physical world his choices are limited by the people he meets at 
work or their friends (ibid). This is a crucial point to contrast with Turkle's perception of online activity 
as an escape from reality. Williams, on the other hand, offers an alternative perspective where online 
connection actually empowers some individuals to find meaningful relations formed around in game 
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objectives away from the restrictions and limitations of the physical world. Durante (2011) notes, along 
a similar line, that while in the physical world identity formation is constrained by social and 
environmental variables, cyberspace may allow its users to construct their “networked contexts of 
communication” and, accordingly, construct their own identity away from undesired restrictions or 
judgment (595).  
3. Pathways to Atheism: Cultural Hybridity and the Formation of Values and Identities 
 Cultural hybridity implies a diffusion of values, lifestyles, beliefs, behaviors and attitudes from 
different cultures that it becomes implausible to make any claims for the authenticity of a particular 
culture based strictly on tradition and historical roots (Bhabha, 88). Upper middle class Egyptian 
families particularly are characterized by high exposure and consumption of foreign cultural products 
such as movies, music, TV and video games. Furthermore, most Upper Middle Class Egyptian families 
send their children to bilingual schools where English is the language of instruction. In fact, all of my 
interlocutors are indeed bilingual and all, including Jackson and Grace who experienced strict religious 
socialization, were also allowed almost without any qualms to consume western cultural products such 
as music, movies, video games and literature.  
For instance, Layth recalled that during his childhood he was particularly impressed with He-Man and 
The Masters of the Universe, a popular American cartoons in the 1980s. At the end of each episode He-
Man, the cartoon's protagonist, would conclude it with a brief lesson concerning life and ethics such as 
the imperativeness of honesty and helping people who are in need. Layth told me that, as a child, he 
took He-Man's lessons quite seriously because he looked up to the character and respected his heroism 
and good nature. Interestingly we know from the previous chapter that Layth's mother, despite being 
religious, was not interested in religious socialization because she was concerned it might radicalize her 
children. Therefore, what we are presented here in Layth's account is, at least, one alternative to 
religious socialization that was made available by his family's socioeconomic status. This is significant 
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because throughout the previous chapter we constantly encountered the implications of cultural 
influences outside the family that has, across all the cases, contributed to the lack of interest in religion 
regardless of the intensity of religious socialization. 
 Layth's account of He-Man's appeal is not exceptional. Alison for instance, despite her moderate 
religious socialization, told me that she used to listen to and adore pop artists and would even hang 
their posters on her bedroom's walls without objection from her parents. Similar experiences and 
interests were recalled by all of my other interlocutors which pinpoints the reach and influence of the 
consumption of western cultural products on shaping the tastes, ideas, beliefs, attitudes and values of 
not just my interlocutors but also most upper middle class Egyptians. This seems to fit well with 
Bourdieu's conception of habitus and its relation to social class as well as its implications on social 
behavior and identity formation. If people behave and think with accordance to what is made available 
to them, then access and consumption of western cultural products could, at least partially, explain why 
alternative lifestyles that does not conform to religious socialization was appealing to my interlocutors 
as we've discovered in the previous chapter. I realize that my argument seems to suggest a dichotomy 
of eastern-western values and lifestyles but this is precisely what I am not suggesting. In fact, Egypt 
has a very rich cultural diversity, different political orientations and various lifestyles that blurs east-
west distinctions in cultural analysis. As discussed by Sherine Hafez's (2011) study of women working 
in Al-Hilal organization, speaking of a dichotomy of values and culture is neither fruitful nor accurate 
because of the complex imbrication of values, strategies and ideas between Islam and modernity or 
between Islam and secular values. With that in mind, and given the upper middle class' characteristic 
exposure to foreign cultural productions and bilingual education, we could infer that the socialization 
of my interlocutors was itself multi-faceted and rich with imbrications and contradictions. 
Accordingly, perhaps the disconnection from religion was a result of the interplay of the imbrication 
and amalgamation of the various elements shaping cultural hybridity. In other words, atheism could be 
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perceived as an outcome and a manifestation of the silent tension and failed negotiations between the 
various identities acquired through socialization and exposure to their highly imbricated hybrid cultural 
experience. Analysing my interlocutors' pathway to atheism through the family, while has provided an 
important and needed background, was also proven to be incomplete. We have established that loose 
religious socialization predisposes children to alternative lifestyles and ideas. We have also observed 
that, despite moderate and strict religious socialization, outside influences may override acquired and 
inherited religious identity. The question is, therefore, how do these outside cultural influences become 
so pervasive? In relation to my interlocutors how can we, for example, explain Layth's need to develop 
his own understanding of religion? Furthermore, why wasn't he able to maintain and develop this 
understanding and instead transformed to atheism? 
We know from the previous chapter that Layth was dismayed that, as per mainstream religious 
discourse, his mother's piety and moral fabric was in question simply because she did not wear the veil. 
Similarly, conversations with my some of my interlocutors have highlighted their perception of a 
contradiction between humanist and religious world-views where the latter divides mankind into 
categories of believers and disbelievers. This division, some of my interlocutors claimed, presents 
disbelievers as grave criminals who deserve eternal suffering which incited them to question and doubt 
Islam's moral integrity. For example, Joe recalls that he was upset with Friday sermons that tackled the 
damnation of non-believers and prayers for their demise and vanquish. “Why would a good Japanese 
person suffer eternally even if he heard about Islam and chose not to become Muslim?” Joe asked 
rhetorically. Similarly, Layth and Jackson claim that the exclusivity of salvation for Muslims was 
particularly troubling for them. “I was concerned that my Christian friends are destined to hell. I 
thought that they were good people and that no just God would torture them eternally for simply being 
born into the wrong religion and holding on to it like everybody else does” Layth told me. It's difficult 
to categorize these sentiments as a showdown between western and Egyptian values because they have 
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been internalized without such categorization and also because they relate to people that my 
interlocutors encounter in their everyday. Surely these encounters could be physical, as in the case of 
Christian friends and neighbours, or virtual through the consumption of cultural products such as that 
of musicians, artists, actors and writers. What is important, nevertheless, is that at a particular point a 
conflict between various voices within them was materialized in the need to clearly position themselves 
against religion or at least mainstream religious discourse. In a sense, this positioning highlights 
failures of negotiating their identities internally. Recognizing this tension once again, however, 
provides us with an incomplete answer as to why have my interlocutors transformed into atheism. In 
other words, why wasn't this tension resolved? 
Some of my interlocutors recall that they have, with varying degrees, attempted to reconcile conflicting 
voices and world-views within them. For instance, Joe and Jackson well before turning to atheism 
believed that the theory of Evolution was a valid explanation of the development of life and 
acknowledged that it didn't sit well with religious narratives and stories about creation. While initially 
this recognition didn't pose a threat to their religious identity, a need to resolve this contradiction was 
developed with the emergence of further internalization of conflicts between non-theistic and religious 
world-views. To Jackson this process was accelerated by the pressure exercised on him by his family 
once he expressed his doubts in religion. To Joe, however, it was the September 11 attacks that 
intensified this tension and the need to resolve it. Because radical Islam was being centred towards 
global scrutiny after the attacks, Joe felt overwhelmed with the fierce debates on Islam and its links to 
terrorism and violence. “I found arguments at my face that I couldn't brush off coming from both critics 
and defenders of Islam and then a dilemma happened” Joe recalls. He was no longer sure if his own 
liberal interpretations of Islam, born out of his loose religious socialization, where indeed true to the 
texts or were rather what he wanted them to be to get some peace of mind. Furthermore, Joe's 
international school friends were “open minded”, as Joe described them, and were interested in 
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discussions about religion that went on for a long time until most of them decided that religion was 
man made. “All the controversial stuff kept popping up in these discussions. Things such as polygamy, 
punishing apostates and gender inequality seemed part and parcel of religion and I couldn't just brush 
them off” he told me. Layth, who we know attempted to develop an individualistic understanding of 
religion, has a similar account. Like Joe, the September 11 attacks intensified the tension between his 
own interpretations of religion and mainstream religious discourse. “September 11 put Islam under the 
spotlight and all of a sudden the stark differences between how I perceive Islam and how it is preached 
and taught became apparent” he told me. Layth, however, was initially not sceptical about Islam and, 
instead, felt that preaching violence, hatred towards non-Muslims, restriction of liberties and misogyny 
were the antithesis of Islam. Upon further investigation online, however, Layth grew sceptical of 
religion and faced a severe faith crisis. “The more I read the more it turned out to me that it was, in 
fact, the preachers I've long disagreed with are the ones more true to Islam and that my values had no 
grounds in religion” Layth contended. Layth was severely traumatized as, unlike Hunter, religion was 
not just an important part of his identity but also a great source of support and peace of mind. “I 
frantically spent hours upon hours reading books and online articles as well as joining online discussion 
groups but the increased knowledge grew like an avalanche and took everything I believed in on its 
way” Layth proclaimed. One night, Layth recalls, with tears in his eyes, that he started praying and 
begging God for guidance and protection of his faith but his desperation amounted to a sudden 
“spiritual disconnection” and, for the very first time, walked out of prayers and never performed it 
again. “This it. It's over. That is what I told myself” Layth recalls. 
In summary of this section, there are two points to observe to further develop this discussion. Firstly, 
the cultural influence coming from outside the family that we've observed in the previous chapter could 
be traced in two variables that are staples of the Egyptian upper middle class experience; the heavy 
consumption of western cultural products and the diversity within the broader Egyptian culture which 
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we identified as cultural hybridity. These two variables account for both the availability and allurement 
of alternative lifestyles which could explain the “disconnection” from religion that many of 
interlocutors have reported. Secondly, this exposure to the broader culture developed an internalized 
tension between the mainstream religious discourse delivered through religious socialization and 
alternative value system and ideas. When this tension is not resolved my interlocutors seemed to favour 
the values and perceptions of the world that they acquired from the broader cultural context over 
religious ones. We already know that exposure to alternative lifestyles and ideas was made possible by 
the readily available and accessible manifestations of cultural hybridity such as the diversity within the 
broader culture, music cassettes, cartoons, movies and literature. However, as per the accounts of 
Helios, Layth, Joe, Grace and Jackson we also know that online research and discussions played an 
important role in their pathway to atheism particularly because they were able to access information 
and engage in discussions that are otherwise obscured and difficult to do without risks. Therefore, to 
further account for the relation between globalization and the formation of atheist identity we also need 
to examine online activities and cyberspace as a medium for the unregulated exchange of alternative 
ideas as well as the development of online communities and a relatively safer avenue for self-
expression. 
4. Pathway to Atheism: Cyberspace and Unregulated Knowledge 
Globalization is the “cultural, economic and demographic processes that takes place within nations but 
also transcends them” (Basch, 11-12). As discussed in the literature, many anthropologists and social 
scientists have become increasingly aware that many cultures are no longer bounded, if they ever were, 
with boarders, oceans and territories. As we've observed earlier the free flow of information and 
consumption of cultural products, which are in turn buffed with bilingual education and access to the 
Internet, interrupt religious socialization by offering a diversity of alternative world-views, values and 
lifestyles. Durante (2001) argues that cyberspace allows its users to establish their own “networked 
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contexts of communication” and, consequently, construct their identities away from regulation and 
restriction by the state and society (595). Accordingly, it is by no coincidence that many of my 
interlocutors have, one way or the other, mentioned the internet in reflections on their transformation to 
atheism.  
The internet marks pathways to atheism in two ways. First, the Internet allows access to information 
and ideas concerning religion and perceptions of the world that are, otherwise, largely restricted. 
Second, the Internet allows atheists to express themselves and to converse with others without 
restrictions whether due to anonymity or the availability of designated atheist communities online. For 
instance, Layth recalls spending hours every day in chat rooms and online forums that were dedicated 
to discussions on religion. Layth was consequently exposed to criticisms to Islam that further amplified 
his doubts which is almost exclusively only possible, at least without social backlash and legal 
repercussions, in the unregulated and anonymous medium of the Internet.  
Similarly, Joe recalls that with growing doubts in his “liberal” interpretation of Islam, he was able to 
seek answers on the internet by examining debates on Islam which, otherwise, he had no access to.  
Furthermore, many of interlocutors recalled downloading books, reading articles, accessing Wikipedia 
entries and streaming documentaries which helped change their world-view and understanding of 
religion in the confines and privacy of their bedrooms without regulation or restriction. 
Indeed it's quite difficult to find books that promote atheism, evolution or critique of religion, and Islam 
in particular, in conventional book stores and publishers' catalogues. For instance, Helios bought 
Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion on a trip to India which was not available for sale in Egypt. 
According to Helios this book initially had a significant influence on his ideas and perception of the 
world as it provided what he perceived as a “grounded and legitimate explanation of the world” that 
also corresponded with his increasing doubt and dissatisfaction with religious explanations of the 
world. Some others, however, who were not fortunate to afford travelling abroad and escape 
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restrictions imposed on literature critiquing religion, the Internet to them was an open, unlimited and 
unregulated source for books and articles available for download with a click on a mouse. In short, the 
Internet offered my interlocutors' a wealth of knowledge and information that is otherwise restricted 
and unavailable which has helped them shape their ideas and change their perceptions of the world. 
Furthermore, the Internet facilitates finding communities and engaging in conversations and debates 
about life, religion and atheism that is, otherwise, extremely difficult to do in the physical world. For 
example, for Grace, the Internet served as an unrestricted medium of discussion where one of her 
friends, an atheist himself, buffed her doubts about God's existence, particularly after her rape ordeal, 
in “one last final blow” to her theism.  
This is not to say that such conversations could not take place away from the internet but rather that the 
internet facilitates sharing and reflection on experiences by lifting physical barriers and social 
restrictions. This is particularly exemplified by Jackson's membership in an anonymous Facebook 
group for atheists that helped him express himself and exchange ideas with like-minded individuals 
from all over the world. This is significantly important to take note off particularly because, away from 
the internet, he was not allowed to express and develop his ideas whether by his school management 
which temporarily expelled him or by his social network of family and friends who were shocked and 
dismayed by his beliefs. In other words, despite society's judgement and discrimination as well as the 
state's regulation and restriction, the internet doesn't only facilitate access to information that is 
otherwise blocked and banned but it also offers a space where individuals could virtually present 
themselves as they desire. 
5. Religion and Atheism: the Interplay of Discourses  
Foucault (1969) uses the term discourse to describe power relations as manifested through both 
practices and language. These power relations encompass values, norms, beliefs and ideas that shape 
the individual’s subjectivity and form his positioning within the broader social context. Cultural 
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hybridity allows not merely the existence of different discourses but also the overlapping and often 
competing ones. As evident in my interlocutors’ accounts the unresolved tension and competition 
between religious, scientific, humanistic and nationalist discourses has facilitated the imagination of 
atheism as either a conceivable closure or a consequent burden of the tension. Conceptualizing religion 
as a discourse allows us to capture an essential essence of the sense of disconnection from religion that 
many of my interlocutors have experienced. For example, the collision between concepts and values 
such as the exclusivity of salvation for believers and humanistic empathy for the eternal fate of 
mankind, the repressive terms of social placement for women and claims for gender equality, religious 
discrimination and equal citizenship, sharia law and civil liberties, pious behaviour and choice, to name 
a few, outline the prologues of disconnection from religion and its ramifications. Accordingly, we’re 
incited to conceptualize religion as a discourse that is intrinsically bound and shaped by the larger 
social context. This includes the political context since disconnection from religion is often inspired by 
conflicts with state sanctioned religious discourse in relation to its power and the subjectivity of its 
citizens. Moreover, it also includes the context of socioeconomic arrangements since some of my 
interlocutors have accounted for the allurement of available and consumable cultural products and 
avenues that allow alternate social behaviour. Consequently, just as religion could not be conceived or 
conceptualized away from its context, the formation of atheism as an identity could not be understood 
without accounting for the underlining social, economic and political influences. I am not arguing that 
turning to atheism is devoid of intellectual integrity and neither am I proposing a power-reductionist 
explanation. Instead I am arguing that it would be an incomplete and perhaps futile to conceptualize 
atheism as merely an intellectual or a philosophical position without, at least, accounting for the 
different variables that made this position possible to be imagined.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter built on the background that we have established through the examination of the 
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implications of different types of religious socialization on my interlocutors' emotions, attitudes, values 
and ideas that, in different ways, predisposed them to apostasy. The embodiment of cultural formations 
particularly seemed to spark tension within some families or produce an internalized tension between 
the expectations of “proper” social behaviour and the desire for an alternative lifestyle. Analysing the 
formation of atheist identities within the family, however, fell short in completely explaining my 
interlocutors' pathway to atheism since we have constantly, across all the cases, encountered cultural 
influences coming from outside the family. The need to closely examine these influence was further 
amplified with our observation that, regardless of the intensity of religious socialization, the pervasive 
appeal and availability of alternative values, world-views and lifestyles had overridden the religious 
identity acquired by my interlocutors. The main question we've attempted to answer in this chapter is; 
how can we explain the sense of “disconnection” from religion that most of my interlocutors had 
experienced and, one way or the other, reported as the first steps towards apostasy and later atheism? 
Because this “disconnection”, as it became increasingly obvious with every interview I conduct, relates 
to cultural influences coming from outside the family and the appeal of alternative lifestyles and world-
views, I've related most of my interlocutors’ pathway to atheism to the fluid and multi-faceted broader 
culture. I've argued that because Egypt possesses significant cultural hybridity which is further 
intensified by Egyptian upper middle class families' socio-economic status, socialization within the 
family itself was multi-faceted and accommodative of outside influences and particularly the 
consumption of western cultural products and bilingual education. Accordingly, I've argued that when a 
tension arises between different world-views and value systems that are internalized within the 
individual, failures to resolve it positions individuals in an either-or situation where, in the case of my 
interlocutors, religious world-view gave in to scientific or humanistic ones. Furthermore, failures to 
resolve this tension could be partially explained, such as in Grace's account of her rape, through critical 
life events or the implications of global conflicts where religion became central to debates and scrutiny 
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as in the aftermath of September 11. Since I am implying that serious and thorough intellectual 
endeavours as well as research needs to be exerted to attempt to resolve this tension, we were left with 
a significant gap in my analysis of my interlocutors' pathways to atheism; how and where did my 
interlocutors have access to the necessary information and debates on religion? This is an important 
question to tackle because we know for a fact that the Egyptian government imposes restrictions or 
bans altogether articles, books and even movies that may, one way or the other, scrutinize religion. 
Accordingly, we've explored ways, as per my interlocutors' account, of utilizing the Internet as a source 
and destination for gathering information, building knowledge, shaping an atheist identity and self-
expression away from regulations and restrictions. In short, because the Internet can escape from social 
regulation and state control, we can account for it as the final piece in the puzzle as to how individuals 

































My interviews with upper middle class Egyptian atheists has identified several pathways to atheism 
through which when a couple or more variables are combined, abandoning religion and forfeiting faith 
altogether becomes a possibility for individuals with a crisis in faith. Disconnection from religious 
rituals, dissatisfaction with religious explanations of the world as well as the conflicts between values 
preached in mainstream religious discourse and those acquired by individuals otherwise mark some of 
the pathways that I've identified. Additionally, exposure to western culture and literature, bilingual 
education that enables cognitively processing different ideas, the organic diversity of the Egyptian 
culture, loose religious socialization as well as access to the internet allows alternative lifestyles and 
world-views, such as atheism, to become a possibility in the imagination spectrum of individuals. The 
diversity of individual pathways to atheism is also reflected on the different ways by which individuals 
manage their atheism in their daily lives. My discussion on these coping mechanisms will revolve 
around one general question; what is it that enables, incites or prohibits different attitudes and 
behaviors? I will divide my analysis into three parts where I will look at how and why different modes 
of interaction are adopted as per my interlocutors’ accounts of their experiences. This will also help us 
explain and understand the attitude and behavior of some Egyptian atheists which would not only 
reveal the ways they manage and negotiate their identities but also how society accommodates and 
restricts alternative lifestyles and world-views. Before I proceed I need to pinpoint that just as 
individuals may combine several variables in their pathway to atheism, some may also combine various 
modes of interaction with their social environment. Therefore, I don't by any means argue that a 
particular mode of interaction is necessarily set in stone for each individual and rather try to offer 
insights on how some Egyptian atheists may engage with society. For many of interlocutors different 
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modes of interaction are shuffled through according to social settings or as they become more seasoned 
and/or relaxed with managing their identity. 
2. Review of the Literature 
Mechanisms of Atheist Identity Formation 
To move on forward with exploring how individuals manage their atheism we need first to define the 
notion of identity and how it influences individual belief, behavior and attitude. Howard (1991) argues 
that identity is formed when the individual is placed as a social object and with accordance to the 
appropriation of terms of this placement (210). Social placement, through stereotyping and 
categorization, is a convenient method for society to establish terms of social interaction without 
necessarily learning or taking in account the details and complexities of each individual experience. 
Identity can, accordingly, be thought of as a reaction to said categorizations and the terms of interaction 
dictated by social placement. However, identity is also a product of reflection where individuals 
establish their behavior and attitude towards their immediate social environment and broader social 
context. Identity could therefore also be seen as a consequence of everyday interaction with not only 
social environment but also self-reflection and individual thought. This general double sided 
characteristic of identity summons an immediate need for the deconstruction of social categories and 
conveniently developed stereotypes that conceal details rich of diversity and uniqueness that are pivotal 
to understanding any social experience. Furthermore, it lays the ground for identifying identity as a 
multifaceted notion of the self rather than a fixed and singular self-understanding. If indeed identity is a 
consequence of social placement that establishes terms of interaction, it could be assumed that the 
individual could potentially react differently when one particular categorization is summoned, ignored 
or not detected.  
Smith (2011), who studied the cases of some atheists in the United States, constructed what he calls of 
“the standard model” of becoming atheists.  There are three basic stages in this model where, to 
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become atheist, firstly, a person gradually challenges and detaches himself from religious cultural and 
institutional expressions. Secondly, cultural, normative and supernatural views and beliefs are pushed 
aside and replaced with a non-theistic world view. Finally, a person “comes out” and affirms his beliefs 
and ideas which Smith argues is the most important final step in creating an atheist identity. In 
summary the pathway to atheism, according to Smith, involves challenging and detaching from 
religion, replacing theistic views with scientific or humanistic ones and affirming one's identity 
publicly. Le Drew (2013) criticizes Smith's standard model for implying a strictly fixed linear trajectory 
of identity formation and suggests that, instead, we must take in account the nature of socialization 
atheists encounter to take in account more possibilities of becoming atheist and expressing being 
atheist. 
Erving Goffman (1963) classifies identity into two categories based on their visibility. The first 
category is discredited identity which is visible and could be immediately identified such as race, 
gender or disability. The second category is discreditable identity which is invisible and cannot be 
immediately identified without individual public assertion such as ideology, religion or sexual 
orientation. Therefore, due to the visibility of discredited identities particular terms of interaction, 
expectations and stereotypes maybe enforced on the individual without a chance for escape. On the 
other hand, discreditable identities allow the individual to react in different ways when interacting with 
others since they are not readily identified. Accordingly, individuals holding one or more discreditable 
identities, and hence invisible ones, can choose to pass on revealing their identities and act as if they 
don't hold them. Conversely individuals holding one or more discreditable identities can choose to 
affirm them and, consequently, resist and challenge the associated stigmas. Atheism, as a discreditable 
identity, allows atheists to choose different ways of interacting with others where their beliefs are not 
necessarily summoned and, consequently, avoid the terms of social placement.  
The division of identity into discredited and discreditable identities does not only offer insights on 
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various ways atheists can negotiate, pass or affirm their identity but also the means by which society 
appropriates alternative lifestyles and beliefs. In many of the cases I've interviewed there seems to be a 
striking difference of society's reaction when a particular problematic or controversial behavior of an 
atheist, such as alcohol consumption, is practiced casually without justification and when it is practiced 
with an assertion of an atheist identity that lifts mainstream restrictions. What this goes to show is that 
passing stigmatized identities can offer a relative freedom to act that is devoid of social criticism and 
scrutiny. On the other hand an affirmation of stigmatized identities, while behaving the same way, can 
incur a social backlash. Understanding atheism in Egypt as a social experience must take in account 
these differences does not reveal the different possibilities of behaving as an atheist but also sheds the 
light on the different ways atheists position themselves in their social world based on their ability or 
desire to affirm or pass their identities in social interaction. The division of identity into discredited and 
discreditable ones is useful for anticipating various means of interaction especially when a stigmatized 
identity is not visible or pronounced. Realizing the difference between both, however, is not necessarily 
preceded by the assumption that a particular identity must always dictate and influence all behavior at 
all times. Individuals may possess different identities at once where the individual combines gender, 
occupation, religious background, social status, education, hobbies and so on. Identities often overlap, 
supersede, marginalize and amplify one another. In other words, identities are as complex and 
imbricated as the infinite social and even biological variables that shape them. Stryker (1981), 
accordingly, suggests that identities are constructed and organized into a “hierarchy of salience”. 
Salience, in this sense, is the way by which an individual places his identities into this hierarchy where 
particular identities maybe useful or important at given times with given people or ignored and 
marginalized at other instances with other people. In other words, an individual with a stigmatized 
identity does not necessarily have to choose between concealing or affirming his identity as in some 
instances of interaction there is no need to do either. In other instances, a stigmatized identity might not 
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be as important as other ones to an individual and, accordingly, his behavior is influenced by other 
identities almost at all instances even when there is a window of opportunity to enact this stigmatized 
identity without backlash or alienation. In other words, a possession of a particular identity does not 
necessarily imply that particular behavior or attitude would follow at some or any given times. 
Religion, or lack thereof, is usually more salient than other identities as it establishes world-views and 
group membership for the individual. However, acknowledging the organization of identities into a 
hierarchy of salience is useful when observing the case of Egyptian atheists as it could help us in the 
deconstruction of atheism as a social category by taking in account both individual experiences and the 
different possibilities of social action. What salience implies is not just the possibility of an identity 
superseding another but also the negotiation of identities within an individual prior to social interaction. 
Salience, therefore, could help us understand and explain why atheists don't always think and behave in 
the same way which is an observation that does not only offer insights on individual experiences but 
also the social conditions that allow different modes of behavior. 
Atheist Identity and Coping Mechanisms 
Stigmatized identities may put a burden on the individual even without assertion because it could incite 
a feeling of social alienation or detachment if the terms of social placement are devaluing, hostile or 
otherwise antagonistic. While this may pose a minimal problem to individuals who don't consider 
atheism as high in salience, individuals who feel strongly about atheism as an identity may feel an 
uncomfortable social pressure especially if they are met with particular expectations to display some 
level of religiosity or observance to religious tradition and rites. Since atheism is uncommon in Egypt 
and because religion serves as a collective identity, some atheists may feel a lack of social solidarity 
due to not sharing common interests, values and experiences with their community. Brewer (1991) 
argues that collective identities serve as a “buffer” that protects the individual from feeling worthless 
and vulnerable (481). Therefore, it is necessary to consider how atheists react to the terms of their 
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social placement and categorization as well as how they position themselves in their social 
environment. From earlier discussion in this chapter we know that, since atheism is a discreditable 
identity, atheists can choose to pass their identity to avoid problematic terms of social placement. But 
even when that is the case one could assume that atheists devise ways to negotiate their identities both 
within themselves and with their social environment. That is equally true with atheists who affirm their 
identity as they will, consequently, have to deal with the repercussions of “coming out”. 
Acknowledging this challenge is crucial to understanding what it means to be atheist and how the 
behavior and attitude of atheists is shaped. Further in-depth analysis and study of the cases of Egyptian 
atheists could reveal different coping mechanisms as well as social settings that enable or restrict social 
action. I will, however, attempt to identify if some patterns exist in the way some Egyptian atheists 
become atheist and behave accordingly. 
4. Being Atheist in Egypt: Passing 
Holding an atheist identity could have serious legal and social repercussions in Egypt. Many atheists 
who publicly announce their ideas are prosecuted for “defamation of religion” and could be met with 
several years in prisons if they are convicted in courts. Furthermore, the official state campaign to 
“battle atheism” has outlined an obnoxious portrayal of atheists who, according to the campaign's 
propaganda, are necessarily immoral, corrupted, dangerous and threatening to social cohesion and 
public order. In addition, around 86% of Egyptian Muslims believe that the death penalty is an 
appropriate punishment for apostasy. It is, thus, understandable that some Egyptian atheists would 
choose to pass their identity out of fear of legal prosecution and social ostracism.  
Passing is by far the most common mode of interaction that I identified after speaking to my 
interlocutors who are ominously aware of the potential grave consequences of publicly self-identifying 
as atheists. Alison, who was quite religious until her early twenties, strictly keeps her beliefs for herself 
away from her parents, siblings and co-workers. “I want to spare myself debates, heartbreaking my 
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family and social rejection. To say the least I will become a freak” she told me. Jackson who at one 
point strongly affirmed his identity to his family and school peers recalls that the negative backlash got 
him expelled from school and forced to take medicine to “cure atheism” and, accordingly, “learn the 
hard way” that there are things that are better kept to oneself. Joe, on the other hand, did not encounter 
major conflicts with his family when he “came out” as an atheist. This is an interesting difference to 
observe because as while Joe experienced loose religious socialization, Jackson and Alison experienced 
varying degree of significant religious socialization. Furthermore, it's also worth noting that Alison is 
concerned about her parent’s feelings which signifies the good relations she had with her parents 
despite abandoning the religious lifestyle they wanted for her. Accordingly, we could argue that while 
good parental relations may facilitate the adoption of alternative lifestyles, it also doesn't necessarily 
mean that parents would accept their children's atheism, at least with not resistance or expressing 
distressed emotions. 
 While Joe says that his family deals with his atheism as “something in the background” or some sort of 
an elephant in the room,  he proclaimed that he strictly passes his beliefs in the work space because he 
just “wants to get out of it what is there to achieve; a good living standard”. Joe, who was initially 
inclined to discuss his beliefs whenever an opportunity presented itself, was preemptively and 
indirectly warned about the consequences of public proclamation of atheism in one significant 
encounter with his co-workers. “My colleagues were once recollecting their experiences with 
consuming alcohol, which is one of my favorite pass times, and when I attested that I usually drink 
after work without displaying regret I was met with dismay and shock despite the fact that some of 
them at least occasionally or at some point in their lives did the same” Joe recalled. “I became Joe, the 
drinker, and I didn't want to be labeled as such. Imagine what it would be like if I was also Joe the 
atheist” he added. Since then Joe has been met with curiosity and questioning about his religious 
believes specially that he misses out on prayers and objects to playing Qur'anic verses in the 
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background at work. “I am sometimes asked whether or not I miss on prayers because I am lazy or not 
convinced but I try to be diplomatic about it and try to brush it off without giving answers” he told me. 
While some of his co-workers display annoyance and shock when he asks them not to play Qur'anic 
verses in the background, they always comply when he argues that the work-place should be neutral 
specially when there are Christians who are also working there.  
Joe's experience highlights that attaching blunt non-theistic justification for public display of 
irreligiosity that implies a deliberate disregard of religion makes it even more problematic and 
controversial. This is particularly important for understanding how society accommodates and manages 
alternative lifestyles as it seems that while impiety, as in not behaving religiously as expected, could be 
relatively tolerated and accepted, irreligious attitude and announced disbelief may incur restriction, 
rejection and backlash.  
Grace shares the same work-ethic with Joe as she also avoids publicly announcing her atheism with her 
co-workers. “My family know that I'm atheist but why do I need to speak about it with my colleagues? 
Atheism is not an issue or a value that I feel strongly about promoting or defending it when I could use 
my time at work and elsewhere to do the things I need or enjoy” Grace told me. Joe and Grace's 
experience seem to highlight that differences in the salience of atheism doesn't necessarily dictate 
different modes of interaction where, despite Joe's higher recognition of his atheist identity, he chooses 
to pass his identity out of convenience. The fluidity of identity and the potential changes in salience is 
an important characteristic that we need to account for when trying to understand how some atheists 
behave and negotiate their identity.  
Helios and Layth, like Jackson and Joe, recall that initially they felt compelled to seize every 
opportunity to come out as atheists but eventually decided to, selectively, keep their ideas to themselves 
especially when they came to self-identify with several other identities and experiences other than their 
irreligiosity. “I may be agnostic but I am also a father, a researcher, an educator, a musician, a soccer 
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fan boy and a humanist. I no longer needed to assert my agnosticism as it became, eventually, just 
something in the background when there is so much else going on. In other words, I became more free 
to select how I interact with others without necessarily feeling that I need to attest my disbelief to gain 
acceptance or do the things I wanted” Layth clarified.  
All these accounts highlight passing as an effective coping mechanism whether out of convenience, 
experiencing severe backlash or simply ranking salience of disbelief lower in the hierarchy of identity. 
Moreover, passing is made even more appealing since behavior and alternative lifestyles are more 
tolerated and less restricted when disbelief is not attached and announced as a justification. In short, 
finding a space to adopt different lifestyles, practice hobbies and experience life as desired doesn't 
summon a need to announce an atheist identity or to negotiate choices based on a claim for equal rights 
and social recognition. This space, however, shouldn't motivate us to readily nullify the fear of social 
backlash, ostracism and legal prosecution as these consequences are, more often than not, taken in 
consideration when some Egyptian atheists choose to adopt passing as a coping mechanism. 
5. Being Atheist in Egypt: Affirmation   
Despite the potentially grave social and legal consequences of declaring atheism, some Egyptian 
atheists are compelled to “come out” as atheists with varying degrees of comfort. For some Egyptian 
atheists, as we've already discussed, the affirmation of an atheist identity is an initial phase that may 
become superseded by convenience, experiencing social backlash or changing the salience of atheism 
in their hierarchy. However, some Egyptian atheists choose to continue affirming their identity despite 
the negative terms of social placements.  
Layth, who often chooses to pass his disbelief, acknowledges that he also occassionaly finds no qualms 
about expressing it “The way I manage expression of disbelief depends on the context. There is no need 
for everyone to know the way I think and I don't feel that it's the only important part of who I am.” 
Layth said to me. “However, sometimes I choose to openly express my disbelief especially when I 
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know that such announcement will be tolerated or is necessary” he added. “When I had my first child 
my family wanted me to circumcise him as per tradition. When circumcision became a repeated issue 
open for debate I asserted that I will not do such a thing because it comes from outdated and primitive 
scripture and had no medical basis. That was that and openly coming out with my disbelief seems to 
have ended the discussion” Layth recalls.  
Tolerance of disbelief or urgency of its proclamation, however, are not the only variables for 
affirmation. We already know that besides avoiding social backlash and ranking disbelief lower in 
salience, the ability for most the Egyptian atheists I've encountered to adopt their desired lifestyle 
without proclamation of disbelief makes passing a more appropriate coping mechanism than 
affirmation. Why is it, accordingly, that some Egyptian atheists choose to affirm their identity despite 
the potential consequences?   
Hunter says that while he doesn't seek to announce his atheism whenever possible and that he avoids 
crossing the “red lines” such as insulting religious figures. However, he also doesn't shy away from 
debating religion when the subject is opened up. Hunter also doesn't give excuses when asked to join a 
prayer group or asked why he doesn't pray. Instead Hunter asserts that he doesn't pray because he 
doesn't know if God exists or not. This is quite remarkably a very straightforward answer that, as 
Hunter acknowledges, is a shocker to many people. The question is what is it that enables Hunter or 
motivates him to be so open when most of my other interlocutors tread very lightly when confronted 
with the issue? Hunter proclaims that he is open about his disbelief not because he has a need to assert 
his identity but rather that he is generally honest and straightforward in communicating what he thinks 
and feels about everything. “I treat people fairly. Help them when they are in need and I am generally 
kind to others. I don't need to explain myself to them if they don't like or don't accept who I am” Hunter 
explained.  
But is character and personal qualities enough to explain Hunter's openness? Hunter acknowledges that 
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while his character doesn't allow people to push him around for his open disbelief or expression of 
ideas, his status in the work place primarily discourages people from taking any shock or dismay 
further. Hunter explains that he is “well connected” to the upper management of his work place which 
makes his colleagues reluctant to confront him because they don't want to anger him. Williamson and 
Yancey (2013) speak of a “majority group status” that enforces some atheists' ability and desire to 
make “determinations about social and theological reality” (40). It could be the case that with Hunter's 
social status, economic wellbeing and prestige that he is able to comfortably be open about his disbelief 
while avoiding many, but obviously not all, terms of social placement dictated by categorization and 
stereotyping. Nevertheless, Hunter acknowledges that this would not have been possible if he was 
working at another place or if he crosses the “red-lines” mentioned earlier. Accordingly, Hunter's 
experience highlights that even with “coming-out” one could assume that there is a variety of ways by 
which outspoken atheists or agnostics express themselves and present their ideas.  
Hunter's case highlights these differences when compared to the harsh critique and flat-out ridicule of 
religion, and particularly Islam, that Ismail Muhammad1, an outspoken atheist activist, adopts. Ismail 
has appeared on few TV programs where he has declared his atheism. Ismail also runs a busy Facebook 
page and a Youtube program, entitled “The Black Ducks” where he conducts interviews with other 
outspoken atheists who reflect on their experience as atheists and express their ideas on religion. 
Ismail’s online activities include propagation of scientific explanations of the universe, civil rights 
activism, critique of religion and, at many times, ridicule of religious figures and texts. Ismail's first 
appearance on Egyptian TV channel CBC caused a public uproar and reinforced the media outcry that 
atheism is a “worrying and dangerous phenomenon”. Despite the media outcry, the social backlash and 
the possibility of facing legal prosecution, Ismail doesn't seem to back down. Ismail explains his 
persistence on two grounds. Firstly, Ismail believes that the shock value of “coming-out” and not only 
                                                 
1Both Ismail and I felt and agreed that because he is already outspoken about his beliefs and has publicly voiced his 
opinions on Youtube and Egyptian TV channels that we don't need to mask his identity or give him an alternative name. 
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expressing disbelief but also openly critiquing and ridiculing religion is necessary to the recognition of 
the civil rights of not just atheists but also all Egyptians. “There can be no middle grounds about it. We 
either want or respect all civil rights for all Egyptians or we don't” Ismail explained. Secondly, Ismail 
believes that attacking society at the core of its disregard of civil and human rights, which he largely 
attributes to religion, is necessary for social and political change. This attack also, Ismail contends, 
could possibly dry out the basin of ideologically recruiting extremists and Islamists in general. In other 
words, affirmation of an atheist identity to Ismail serves his activism and overarching social and 
political goals. Furthermore, this affirmation, according to Ismail, is necessary for him to become a full 
citizen with fully recognized rights. Ismail's case presents a significant difference in using affirmation 
as a coping method in comparison with Hunter and, even more, with most of my interlocutors who 
don’t feel that “coming out” is necessary to adopt whichever lifestyle they prefer. 
6. Being Atheist in Egypt: Pretending 
Goffman's two categories of interaction, passing and affirmation, largely cover a variety of reasons why 
some Egyptian atheists behave in a particular way. The interviews with my interlocutors has revealed 
an additional third mode of interaction where some Egyptian atheists temporarily adopt a Muslim 
identity. This Muslim identity could be fully fledged, one that is just as observant of traditions and 
rituals as everyone else or one that is relaxed and rather negligent in performing religiously as expected 
while implying that religious beliefs are still held. The latter, as coined by three of my interlocutors, is 
called being a Muslim Menafad2. The key difference between passing and pretending is that the former 
doesn't convey information about either belief or disbelief whereas the latter either asserts or implies a 
Muslim identity. Pretending is usually practised when social pressure becomes increasingly pervasive 
and answers as to why a particular behaviour or a ritual is not observed becomes urgent. For example, 
                                                 
2Menafad is a slang term, used mainly by many Egyptian youths, for “negligence” or “never-minding”. An example of it's 
usage would be when one expresses the act of ignoring a task, a commitment, a request or a social situation where a 
particular action or behavior is expected but not performed.   
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Jackson who was met with severe backlash from his family and forced to take anti-depressants to 
“cure” his atheism, attends the Friday prayers every week like “good Muslims do” to fend off his 
family's inquisition. Similarly, Helios at least initially also attended the Friday prayers as not to warrant 
a discussion about his lack of religiosity and regard to religion. Even now, according to Helios, he still 
joins prayers with his colleagues to avoid raising unwanted suspicion and questions about his beliefs. 
During the month of Ramadan both pretend to be fasting, at least when their families are watching, to 
nullify any doubts that they may incur from their behaviour or attitude throughout the year. Therefore, 
both employ pretending as a coping mechanism where a Muslim identity is temporarily adopted and 
conveyed through, at least visibly, a fully-fledged performance of the behaviour expected from a “good 
Muslim”. 
Not all atheists who choose not to “come-out”, however, are comfortable with observing rituals and 
traditions they don't believe in. Accordingly, implying a negligent Muslim identity, one that is Menafad, 
comes as some sort of a compromise between not wanting to be labelled as a disbeliever and not 
forcing oneself to observe particular traditions and rituals just to fend off questions and doubts about 
their true identity. Alison recalls that because she is not veiled and doesn't join prayers with her 
colleagues, that she was often asked whether or not she is Muslim and, if so, why she doesn't pray with 
the rest. Instead of joining prayers to quench her colleague's curiosity she proclaims that she is a 
Muslim who, however, is not particularly observant of religious duties. Sometimes she, jokingly at 
least to herself, asks her colleagues to pray for her “guidance”. This response is usually enough for her 
colleagues to understand and accept her behaviour and move on with their day rather than dwell on 
reasons why she “should” pray and become “closer to God”. Layth occasionally employs this strategy, 
despite sometimes being open about his disbelief in certain contexts when his behaviour or attitude 
draws suspicion. “Sometimes I'd be sitting at a local café during the Friday prayers and because that 
happens a lot I was sometimes asked by the café’s workers why I don't go to the prayers. I sometimes 
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brush it off by saying things such as I hope that one day God would guide me or Al-Shaitan Shater 
(Satan is clever)”. Such answers, Layth proclaims, are completely understood and regarded as a viable 
explanations of not behaving as expected.  
Such situations and the effectiveness of this strategy reminded me of Joe's colleague’s dismayed 
reaction to his blatant and open attestation of consuming alcohol without regret. What these situations 
seem to highlight is that while particular behaviours is frowned upon it is the attitude by which they are 
practiced that decides the difference between acceptance and severe backlash. In other words, if 
typically being atheist means, at least partially, that some restrictions on social behaviour is lifted, it 
could be accepted by society so as long it is not regarded as a statement or a direct challenge to 
religion.  
This is crucial not only to understanding atheism as a social experience but also, and equally important, 
how society manages and accommodates alternative lifestyles. In this sense it seems that society is 
more tolerant of behaviour than of ideas even if the former is a reflection of the latter so as long no 
direct challenges are being perceived to tradition and religion. In short, the model of the Muslim 
Menafad, outlines that society is concerned more with attitude rather than behaviour. These distinctions 
became even more apparent in my investigation of how three local cafés, in the vicinity of a 
neighbourhood mosques, operate during the Friday prayers.  
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we've discussed the different ways my interlocutors “be atheist” through the 
examination of the different coping mechanisms with the social stigma associated with atheism. There 
are two main arguments I am making. Firstly, coping mechanisms are not necessarily set in stone since 
some of my interlocutors shuffle through different strategies and modes of behaviour. Secondly, there 
are overlapping variables that may influence the decision on which coping mechanism to adopt. 
Passing is usually adopted for two main reasons; the fluidity and differences in the salience of atheism 
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in identity hierarchies and the fear of social backlash. Additionally, passing could be adopted out of 
convenience and particularly when desired social gains does not summon the need to assert atheism 
and disbelief. Affirmation is adopted when social backlash could be averted or, at least, diminished out 
of social status. In some instances, as highlighted by Layth who didn't want to circumcise his child, 
affirmation of atheism or disbelief is sometimes necessary to confront and challenge social pressure to 
conform to undesired practices and restrictions. We've also observed that affirmation could be 
employed as a cultural and political resistance to social regulation and state control by atheist activists. 
Finally, pretending to be a negligent Muslim is adopted by individuals who want to fend off suspicion 
and social pressure to observe religious rituals and practices.  
The main difference between affirmation and pretending is that the latter is employed in response to 
situations where questions and doubts about atheists’ religious identities could not be simply brushed 
off and talked out of without compromise. Instead, pretending involves an affirmation of a false 
religious identity either through verbal implications, like using religious mannerisms, or through the 
actual performance of rituals like not eating in public during Ramadan or performing prayers. We have 
also observed through the accounts of my interlocutors and particularly those who usually adopt 
pretending as a coping mechanism that while society may seem to be keen about enforcing a façade of 
observance of religious rituals and traditions, it is largely concerned with people’s attitude and beliefs 
more than behaviour. Furthermore, pretending reveals other mechanisms by which society, in its turn, 
accommodates alternative behaviour through a very basic yet significant accommodative social code; 
impious behaviour could be tolerated and accommodated so as long as no direct, conscious and 
deliberate challenge to religion is perceived. This accommodative social code necessitates further 
examination of ways by which society allows alternative behaviour and lifestyle and its relevance to 










     The discussion in the previous chapter has revealed that pretending as a coping mechanism 
capitalizes on an already established accommodative social code that allows manifestations of impiety; 
not observing particular socially expected religious behavior and practices such as performing prayers 
and wearing the veil. This code is established to relatively accommodate and accept impiety and 
alternative lifestyles so as long as they are not perceived as a conscious and deliberate challenge 
religion. I've argued that while society seemingly frowns upon impious behavior, it is more concerned 
about and more restrictive to alternative ideas and attitudes. We have already explored the multi-faceted 
characteristic of Egyptian culture in relation to globalization, cultural hybridity and religious 
socialization in the previous chapters. Accordingly, we have recognized that alternative lifestyles and 
ideas are made available and conceivable by the diversity within the Egyptian culture and the upper 
middle class socioeconomic status alongside other cultural influences such as religion, the family and 
the state's social agenda. To further understand how individuals experience being atheist in Egypt and 
how they manage the stigma associated with atheism we have to consider broader social strategies that 
negotiate the obligation to observe religion vis-à-vis the desire to behave differently in social settings. 
To achieve this I will examine how public space, as a frontier of cultural formation, is also used, as per 
the accommodative social code I've discussed earlier, to accommodate emotions, desires and lifestyles 
that don't comply with expectations of “proper” behavior expected from “good citizens” and “good 
Muslims”. 
2. Review of the Literature 
 
 Public Space and the Sacred City 
 
In its early development, anthropology was primarily invested in cultural studies of the “other” who 
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was perceived to be primitive and fundamentally different than civilized western societies. A couple of 
variables shifted the outbound attention of anthropologists towards their own societies and nations. 
Firstly, largely due to technological advancements in travel facilitated by airplanes and railways, there 
were becoming increasingly less obscure and “new” societies to explore and study (MacClancy; 2002). 
Secondly, at the start of the 20th century, many anthropologists became interested in studying the 
societies of developing nation states that emerged in the aftermath of the First World War and, 
particularly, countryside and village dwellers.  
Consequently, given the eclectic nature of villages, the city began to become regarded as a primary 
structuring variable and a distinctive research avenue that warranted the development of urban 
anthropology as a sub-discipline of its own. At the same time the Chicago School of Urban Ecology in 
the early 20th century identified the city as “adjacent ecological niches” that human groups inhabited in 
coaxial rings around the core (Wirth 1938). Accordingly, class, status, occupation, experience, values, 
preferences and taste are organized and formed as to where individuals and groups are located in these 
niches and rings. In effect, theorizing the city has become detrimental to understanding daily 
“macroprocessess” in the everyday that relates to symbols, social relations, political economy, social 
structures, values and behavior (Low, 384). In a sense the city was no longer merely perceived as a 
physical plane that is characterized by architecture and environment but rather as a locus of the 
juxtaposition of physical characteristics as well as the desires, beliefs, values, emotions, socioeconomic 
arrangements and memories which Richard Sennett (1994) collectively describes as the “mixture of 
flesh and stone”.  
According to Setha Low (1994) urban anthropology could be divided into four main categories of 
studying the city. The first approach involves studying the city in terms of the social networks that, 
based on the family and kinship relations, form the urban communities inside the city. The second 
approach examines the relation between power and knowledge in urban planning by accounting for the 
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involvement of capital, claims for land tenure rights by the state and human groups, urban renewal, 
new town designs and redevelopment after natural disasters, to name a few.). The third approach 
explores the link between the local and supralocal units of the city such as the flow of 
goods/services/employment from the countryside to the city and vice versa, as a point of analysis of the 
city The fourth approach introduces political economy to studying the cities with attention to social 
issues such as alienation, inequality and the social effects of capitalism and neoliberalism. These 
approaches opened the door for an explosion of literature and perspectives that animates the city and 
recognizes the diversity of experiences within it that, both, transcends and conforms to space. 
With that in mind, most contemporary literature on the city doesn't sharply follow these approaches 
since not only are the social variables shaping life in the city numerous and diverse but are also 
overlapping and interdependent. Setha Low (1996) argues that analyzing contemporary urban 
anthropology and our understanding of the city would be better accomplished through “images and 
metaphors” that heuristically captures different ideas, concepts, perceptions and experiences of the city 
(387). Accordingly, Low conceptualizes literature on the city based on social relations (the ethnic city, 
the divided city, the gendered city and the contested city), economics (the deindustrialized city, the 
global city and the informational city), urban architecture (the modernist city, the postmodern city and 
the fortress city) and religion (the sacred city and the traditional city).  
For instance, conceptualizing the gendered city invokes studies on women's work in the market, 
domestic management and on the street as hagglers. These studies, and more along the same line, 
conceptualize the gendered city as a space by which women “negotiate the contradictions of the city in 
their own particular way” to survive, contest and adapt to the gendered inequalities in terms of access 
to the street, employment and social roles  (Wilson, 8).  For another instance, conceptualizing the 
sacred city incites the examination of the city as a setting where religious systems are embodied and 
civic life is orchestrated by the observance of religious rituals and values. 
79 
 
Edward Reeves (1992) studied shrines erected for Muslim saints in Tanta, a northern Egyptian city, in 
relation to socioeconomic power relations that involve formal institutions as well as the privileged and 
impoverished individuals. Reeves notes that class division and economic inequality both shape and are 
shaped by reverence of Muslims saints and their shrines. The geographical location of Tanta between 
the two branches of the Nile made the city an important trade center especially with the boom in cotton 
trade in the 19th century. Trade fairs and ceremonies that were held in commemoration of the most 
prominent saint in Tanta, A'Sayed Al-Badawi, attracted traders and buyers from Tanta, Cairo and other 
cities in Egypt (309). The economic significance of Tanta, however, withered with the fall of cotton 
prices in the 1930s and eventually blatant differences in wealth and power developed and became more 
apparent (308, 311). Reeves argues that saint shrines in Tanta could be perceived as both a symbol for 
resistance and a venue for justifying and maintaining social order and class inequalities.  
This apparently paradoxical duality could be understood by taking in account two variables. First, 
while particular miracles and powers that are attributed to saints allegedly aids people in personal 
matters such as illness or financial crisis, saints are also believed to be capable of bringing judgment on 
wealthy or powerful individuals who are perceived to be immoral or unfair and cruel to their 
dependents (311). Reeves proclaims that among the many narratives he encountered about the power of 
saints none depicted the saints ever taking the side of the powerful, the wealthy and the authority 
against “common people” (312). Accordingly, we are presented with ways by which the reverence of 
saints, amplified and produced by the erection of physical shrines, manifests resistance to social 
inequality or at least grievances towards individuals who abuse their power. Second, the privileged and 
powerful individuals' donations to the shrines for maintenance, beautification and renovation serve as a 
public display and attestation of their power and status as well as their piety and devotion to God by 
making offerings to his chosen saints (314). In a sense the shrine becomes a locus of flashing and 
expressing wealth and power as well as justifying and normalizing inequalities.  
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3. Close but not Enough: Vicinity and Accommodation of Impiety 
The busy streets of Cairo become almost entirely vacant in early Friday mornings. Most governmental 
institutions and private shops are shut and most people remain in their houses for a great deal of the 
morning providing an unusual serenity and calmness to the few people wandering the streets. The local 
café where I met with Layth was no exception with only a few people around smoking shisha, drinking 
beverages or reading the newspaper. In the background we could listen to recitations of Qur'anic verses 
on TV and quiet conversations between some of the cafe's visitors. As noon approached, the first call 
for the Friday prayers could be heard from a nearby mosque just around the corner, and more people 
started showing up on the streets. Most, with rugs in their hands, would pass by the café on their way to 
the mosque and greet the visitors as they walk by. Suddenly, the street was teeming with people 
heading to the mosque to catch the start of the weekly Friday sermon.  
While attending the sermon from the start in the mosque is a mandatory part of the Friday prayers 
many people choose to join the prayers towards the sermon's end or just about when the prayers is 
going to be performed. As the preacher's voice blasted through the mosque's megaphones, to the extent 
that it was sometimes hard to hear each other, some of the people on the café paid their checks and 
headed to the mosque. However, at the same time, it seemed like those who leave are replaced by even 
more people who were just beginning to make their orders, some with prayer rugs on their laps. With 
the average shisha smoking session taking up to 30 minutes or more I was wondering what the point of 
ordering is if they are going to have to leave shortly. However, most of the newcomers didn't join the 
prayers and not even towards the end of the sermon like many others do.  
At this point the café was packed with visitors and was almost as busy as any day during the same time. 
This scene was repeated almost every single time of the many visits I made. During the prayers the café 
continues to serve its visitors albeit not with the same intensity as some of the workers leave for the 
prayers towards the end of the sermon. The activity of the café didn't seem to bother anyone from the 
residents or the people who were on their way to the mosque as if it's not there. I could even see the 
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back of the mosque right around the corner from where I was sitting and was compelled to think why 
no one is taking notice or expressing frustration with the cafe's activity despite the importance of 
performing the Friday prayers to both practicing and negligent Muslims.  
At one time one of the workers who brings coal for the Shisha asked Layth if he was going to pray and 
Layth jokingly replied that “Satan is clever and the shisha tastes just too darn good” to which the 
worker laughed and moved on with serving other people. Of course had Layth proclaimed that he was 
agnostic or not interested in performing prayers the worker's reaction might have been quite different. 
However, adopting the identity of a negligent Muslim was enough for the worker not to follow up on 
his curiosity and questions. After all, he himself didn't go the prayers and watched over the other 
visitors’ orders.  
At one time I asked the worker why they don't shut down during the prayers and, to my surprise, he 
seemed to be startled as if that is not possibility. Upon repeating the question the worker told me that 
it's not possible because many visitors continue to come and expect to be served. “If we don't serve 
them they will go to our enemies and we will lose people” the worker said jokingly alluding to another 
café just one building away. That other café also had its fair share of visitors so competition seemed 
tough even during that special time of Friday noon. Curios as to how local residents feel about this, I 
asked the worker if there were any complaints about the cafe's operation during the prayers but there 
seems to have not been a single complaint or remark made in that regards. “Residents often complain 
about the noise or the extra space we take when the café is fully operational. Sometimes they complain 
that the café visitors can see inside their houses through windows and balconies but that is all” the 
worker casually told me. In other words, while missing the Friday prayers is a grave sin and repeated 
“offense” could amount to heresy as per some interpretations of Islam, the behavior itself is not just 
tolerated but also considered normal.  
Apart from the one time Layth was asked if he was going to the prayers, missing out has never raised 
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any questions or curiosity as to why he, as many others, prefer to spend the time of Friday prayers 
smoking rather than observing tradition or religious rituals. This seems to amplify my argument that 
while particular behavior maybe frowned upon or considered “wrong”, it could be more or less 
accepted and tolerated so as long no statements are perceived to be made against religion. 
4. Visibility: The Regulation of Public Space 
The situation is entirely different in another café, just a couple of blocks away, from the first one. The 
second café is located just in front of the entrance to the mosque where the inside of the mosque is 
visible. Once the sermon starts no more orders are taken and whichever orders that were already placed 
are hastily served and the visitors are asked, sometimes rudely, to leave. While most people walking by 
on their way to the mosque don't look at the cafe, I've noticed that some others stare for a while at the 
people sitting. I, and perhaps I am wrong, felt that some people expected the café visitors not to be 
there or that the café would seize its activities during that time. However, in the many times I visited 
this cafe, I noticed that more attention is drawn compared to the first café where almost no one even 
seems to notice the activity. Furthermore, this café was not nearly as occupied as the other one with 
sometimes the visitors not exceeding a couple or just slightly more. Interestingly, many times after the 
prayers ended, many of those praying in the mosque would directly head to the café and start making 
orders once it resumes its operation.  
One time I asked one of the workers there why they shut down the business during the prayers and for a 
while I thought the look on the worker's face implied that I must be stupid or extremely ignorant. “We 
can't operate during the prayers, of course!” he proclaimed. “It's haram and would be very disrespectful 
if there are people sitting with their legs crossed in front of the mosque when people are praying” he 
added. Upon further questions he told me that they used to operate during the Friday prayers in the past 
but both some of the local residents as well as the workers complained to the owner and they have, 
since then, decided to shut down during the prayers. “We don't want to make people upset specially that 
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we also want to go the prayers ourselves” he told me. After being a regular visitor after at least two 
handfuls of visits, one of the workers there told me that I could continue to sit and smoke inside the 
cafe if I wasn't going to the prayers. He, almost apologetically, told me that he would leave enough coal 
for the Shisha until they're back but that he is going to have to close the door on me because I can't be 
seen when people come out from the mosque.  
This situation seems to highlight an interplay between behavior and attitude where smoking outside in 
front of the mosque while the prayers are being performed makes an unaccepted statement of disregard 
and disrespect to religion as well as the religious sensitivities of people who attend the prayers. Once 
again it seems that society would accept certain behaviors, even if categorized as “wrong” or “haram”, 
so as long as there is no intention of directly ridiculing or challenging religion. This is made clear by 
the fact that while both cafés operate in the vicinity of the same mosque and that while both owners 
want to continue operation during the prayers time, the visibility of the same behavior is perceived 
differently simply because one café faces the back of the mosque and the other is located directly in 
front of it. In a sense for the first café facing the back of the mosque, missing out on prayers while 
smoking or drinking is not perceived to make any statements and, regardless of how wrong, is not 
nearly as objectionable as behaving the same when people are praying right in front of the visitors. The 
latter seems to incite a perceived direct disregard and challenge to religion.  
The way behavior is negotiated, and whether or not it reflects an objectionable attitude, in terms of 
locality is quite similar to, and perhaps an extension of, the same logic that tolerates and accepts 
particular behavior when no justifications or ideological statements are presented. In a sense one could, 
relatively freely, become an atheist and behave without particular restrictions until he or she “comes-
out” and explains why these restrictions were lifted in the first place. This logic doesn't only explain 
why most of the atheists I've spoken to choose to adopt passing or pretending as a coping mechanism 
but also highlights the possibility of society's accommodation of alternative lifestyles that doesn't 
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openly and directly threaten its values and traditions. 
5. A Brothel in Disguise: Negotiation of Identity, Behavior and Public Space 
While the contrast between the Friday noon operation codes of the two cafés I discussed earlier offers 
very useful insights on the way the perception of attitude produces acceptance and rejection of 
particular behavior, the extent to which this negotiation can go was further amplified by my experience 
in the third and final café I visited. While the other two are relatively cheap and, therefore, visited by 
both working and upper middle class Egyptians, the third café is significantly more expensive and 
selective of its visitors.  
Hunter invited me a few times over a smoke and coffee in what he considers as one of his favorite 
places because it is “shady and naughty but not filthy”. Intrigued by what that meant, Hunter told me 
that upscale prostitutes hangout in that cafe to fish for potential customers. The way business is 
initiated is entirely dependent on mobile phones where a customer first enables his phone's Bluetooth 
and writes down his number in the name tab. This way prostitutes would call the customer on his phone 
to identify him from other visitors and once they do they go sit at his table and negotiate the price. In 
the few times I've visited the café I've noticed that, indeed, some women move from one table to the 
other and, sometimes, leave with a different customer each day. I opened my phone's Bluetooth 
connection a couple of times to see for myself and noticed that many devices were named either with 
phone numbers or nicknames such as “Alexandrian girlie”, “cute girl” and “sugary girl”. Given the 
unusual names of the devices, which is a strategy that I am aware of in other places as well as the fact 
that the same women move from table to table and, sometimes, leave with a different customer each 
day, I think that it's fair to assume that indeed prostitution is conducted in this cafe. What is not clear to 
me, however, is how involved the workers or the management is with this operation. It would be naïve 
to assume that, to say the least, they are not aware of what goes on when I in a few visits was able to 
clearly connect the dots.  
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But even if the café’s management is involved, I asked myself how do the workers feel about it? From 
what I could tell from their relaxed facial expressions and the friendliness the workers display to these 
women, they are somewhat accepting, if not complacent, to the kind of business that takes place under 
their watch. I've deliberately visited this cafe on weekday noon hours to compare it with operation 
during Friday prayers. On weekdays and prior to the prayers on Friday the TV blasts Egyptian pop 
music and I could hear saucy laughter and playful giggles from all around the place. The place is very 
vibrant and busy which is unusual for any cafe operating during the noon when most typical café 
visitors are at college or work. The scene is quite similar in Friday mornings until the first call to the 
Friday prayers. The TV channels that play non-stop music are switched to Qur'an recitations and the 
live national TV coverage of the Friday prayers. Suddenly there are no giggles, no laughter and no 
women jumping from one table to the other, it just becomes eerily quiet. In the background I could hear 
the manager rushing workers to finish their errands so as to catch the prayers before the sermon ends. A 
few moments later the waiter notified us that, while we can stay, no orders will be served until they 
come back from the prayers. The whole scene became even odder to me than it already was since out of 
all places one wouldn't expect a café that facilitates prostitution would be so adamant of observing 
religious rituals. Nevertheless, I conceded and remained at my seat to the obvious annoyance of the 
couple of workers who stayed behind to watch over the place.  
At this point I wanted to put more coal on my shisha because I couldn't drag anymore smoke and since 
I was told that there will be no one to serve me I went to the spot where the coal is kept and took some 
to where I was sitting. One of the workers who was left behind to watch over the place during the 
prayers frantically jumped in the way and frustratingly told me that I can't serve myself. The reason he 
gave me wasn't that I am, understandably, trespassing on the worker's duties or using the café's 
equipment without authorization but rather that it's the management policy that no service will be 
offered during the Friday prayers. Skeptical of the worker's excuse he showed me a printed note placed 
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in a neat hard plastic cover that states that “We apologize. No service will be offered during the Friday 
prayers” and advised me to wait until his colleagues come back.  
This could be perceived as a rather absurd situation which Hunter thought made no sense and is “just 
plain stupid and hypocritical”. However, we've already observed in this research that if an attitude is 
perceived to be exceptionally and directly undermining of religiosity or tradition particular behaviors 
are not accepted or tolerated. In this case I was disregarding reverence and respect of religion by 
wanting to smoke when the prayers is being performed despite the fact that the place is literally a 
brothel incognito. These rules apply to everyone and are observed, of all people, by the prostitutes who 
seize their activities during the Friday prayers. What I am trying to argue is that negotiations of 
accepted behavior could, even if bizarrely, go to extreme length if particular standards that define 
proper attitude towards religion are not crossed. The situation reminded me of Hunter's assertion that 
believers could behave the same way of atheists who lift religious restrictions on themselves out of the 
belief that they hold a “ticket for salvation and redemption” once they decide to stop. However, these 
same people would be dismayed and shocked if an atheist justifies his behavior on non-theistic grounds 
or out of announced disregard of religion. 
6. Being Atheist in Egypt: The (Im)pious City 
Based on the literature I’ve discussed earlier we can conceptualize the city as not merely the 
architecture and design but also, and more importantly, as a space that is expressive of social relations, 
political economy, class divisions and religion. In other words, the city becomes a space for the 
negotiations of the contradictions of culture, and particularly value systems, as well as economic 
arrangements and religion. Levy and Parish conceptualize the “sacred city” where observance to 
religious value systems and beliefs as well as their embodiment is central to civic life. The 
conceptualization of the sacred city, however, leaves a coinciding and mutually exclusive aspect of 
organizing civil life around the observance and embodiment of religious values and systems. As 
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observed earlier the differences in the operation of the two adjacent cafés during the Friday prayers 
highlights the ways by which observance of religious values is negotiated and expressed. While one 
café continues its activity during the prayers, the other café is forced to seize its operation until the 
Friday rituals are performed simply because it directly faces the entrance to the local mosque.  
This implies that impiety is facilitated and embedded within the orchestration of civil life by the 
embodiment and observance of religious systems and values. In other words, impiety is facilitated by 
the religiously based regulation of public space just as individual impious behaviour is accepted and 
understood as per underlining religious values so as long as no threat or explicit challenge to religion is 
perceived. In a sense, we can't fully understand the sacred or pious city without also accounting for the 
underlining and mutual operation of the impious city.  
This is significantly relevant to understanding being atheist in Egypt. As expressed by most of my 
interlocutors, “coming out” as an atheist is not necessary since, in practice, they can move on and 
advance with their desired lifestyle and observe their social and economic interests without necessarily 
putting themselves “out there” and, consequently, having to deal with ridicule, discrimination and quite 
possibly legal prosecution. The negotiation of religious identity and behaviour in the public space, 
largely by a majority of individuals who self-identify as Muslims, is both equally observable and 
employable by Egyptian atheists. Accordingly, being atheist in Egypt, or at least its involvement with 
impious behaviour and alternative lifestyles becomes less distinctive and more organic within contexts 
where almost everyone else is involved in the process of identity and behaviour negotiation.  
Verily, this is in turn contextual and comes with variant degrees in intensity where, for example, 
smoking shisha during the Friday prayers maybe permitted but consumption of alcohol remains to be 
banned and not allowed. 
7. Religion and Atheism: between Belief and Practice  
The prevalence of the accommodative social code that allows impiety calls into question clear-cut 
88 
 
distinctions between belief and practice. On the one hand impious behavior could be, at least loosely, 
accommodated if it is not perceived as a conscious or direct threat to religious belief. On the other hand 
display of piety is a barometer and an articulation of belief. In other words, religion is neither strictly 
just a system of belief nor a model of social conduct. Consequently, conceptualizing religion does not 
need to fall within a tension between uncompromising approaches to religion where it’s either a 
metaphysical and symbolic understanding of the world or a power-driven social institution that shapes 
and is shaped by the sociopolitical context. Instead I am proposing that the religious experience, and by 
extension atheism, is significantly fluid that it renders such binaries obsolete.  
In other words, at given contexts when the accommodative code is operable, atheism and religiosity as 
a binary are incomplete and void analytical categories of behavior. In a sense, at such contexts, 
individuals are not either atheists or believers but are rather active negotiators of terms of social 
placement, regulation and cultural embodiment vis-à-vis their desires, values and beliefs.  
The imbrication of belief and behavior in relation to the accommodative social code incites us to think 
of the employment of such strategies by atheists as a byproduct of an already established need to 
accommodate expressions of impiety of society itself. It’s precisely at this accommodative flexibility of 
social order that the bulwarks of biopower, subjectivity and the regimes of truth are contested. This is 
not to say that power is escapable because the accommodative social code is, by itself, a form of 
regulation and control. What I am arguing instead is to conceptualize power as a dialectical force that 
corresponds to both state or social agendas and individualistic desires. Therefore, in a sense, atheism is 
both resistance to and an organic expression of religious discourse because neither impiety nor piety 
can be conceptualized without the other.   
The analysis of my interlocutors’ pathway to atheism demonstrates that indeed along the pathway 
religion operates as a symbol of meaning, as Geertz argues, which is exemplified in the relentless effort 
and expectations to “feel something”. Rituals, as a subset of symbols, as in the case of Helios and 
89 
 
Alison’s experience with the Omra or the prevalence of a sense of disconnection from religion among 
my interlocutors, are designed and expected to invoke particular emotions and moods that are 
translated into human action and dispositions. This is not to say or to dismiss that these expectations or 
the particular meanings embedded within religious symbols are not contextually shaped or correspond 
to power. Indeed the rejection or reluctance to behave as expected clearly reveals that, as Asad argues, 
religion is not a separate aspect of social life and is rather imbricated with social, political and 
economic power relations. The cutting and burning of Grace’s clothes, the medication imposed on 
Jackson, the dismay of Joe’s colleagues with his drinking, Layth’s repulsion of categorizing his mother 
as deficient and corrupted and the crackdown of the state on individuals who challenge religion, to 
name a few, all highlight that a separation between beliefs and practice or symbols and power is 
conceptually flawed. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
It became increasingly apparent that while the Egyptian society has high regards to religion and that it, 
accordingly, largely organizes civil life around it, there are also socially sanctioned simultaneous 
strategies and possibilities to escape regulations and restrictions. Therefore, while public space is a site 
of cultural formation and expression of society's values and beliefs, it could also be perceived as a field 
for identity negotiation and escape. Some of my interlocutors, who recognize and understand the 
mechanisms by which society regulates its regulation, often capitalize on these strategies to enjoy a 
relatively greater freedom and to learn and practice ways by which they can improve their coping 
mechanisms.  
More importantly observing these strategies allows us to further understand how cultural hybridity is 
materialized in public space and, accordingly, at least partially explain how and why alternative 
lifestyles are approachable, appealing and conceived as a possibility. In a sense, what I am arguing is 
that impiety is as normative and organic as religiosity in Egypt and that, by extension, atheism and 
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particularly its implications on adopting alternative lifestyles is one of the many possibilities that 
“being Egyptian” allows. There is a silver lining to observed, however, which is the accommodative 
social code by which this strategy operates; impiety is often accommodated and accepted so as long it's 
















































     The state’s official campaign to battle atheism and the occasional prosecution of Egyptian atheists is 
presented in terms of the state’s duty to safeguard Islam and to protect its citizens from dangerous and 
damaging ideas. This seemingly spiritual and religious endeavor, however, is underlined by political 
and social variables that are heavily imbricated with religion. This is a point that we keep coming back 
to since at almost every turn we’ve taken in this research religion was heavily involved with other 
institutional and cultural elements in the public sphere. In this chapter I aim to analyze the state's 
interest in categorizing and prosecuting Egyptian atheists in relation to its historically rooted 
interdependent relation with official religious institution and also in relation to the current political 
climate. 
2. The State and Religion: Conceptualizing Interdependence 
If the state is, at least to some extent, synonymous with governance, it could be assumed that it has 
existed for as long as humans existed. Verily the concept of modern states was conceived much later in 
human history around the 18th century but governance, one of the ultimate functions of the state, has 
long been established as a need for human societies for as far back in history as we can examine. In that 
sense the common denominator to all phases and developments of the state is both exercising control 
and maintaining some kind of an order that is necessary to human survival.  
Issawi (1987) argues that “a society without a state is wellneigh impossible” if people's conflict of 
interests due to the scarcity of resources or the complex details of everyday interaction are not kept in 
check. Issawi's contention echoes a philosophical negative outlook on the nature of human existence 
and human nature. There is an established perception in political thought and philosophy that there is a 
need to keep people from each other and that, inevitably, any society will crumble upon itself if 
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individuals are not governed and controlled. This perception characterizes human nature with innate 
self-defeating attributes that must be kept in check. Machiavelli, for instance, contends that particular 
characteristics are innate in human nature and that humans are largely “self-interested” and are quick to 
become spiteful, wretched, selfish and dishonest during times of conflict (Machiavelli and Bull, 95-97). 
Continuing that line of thinking, Thomas Hobbes declared that the “state of nature” of mankind without 
restrains is nasty, short and brute (Held, 69). In effect, a social contract and rule by an absolute 
powerful sovereign, according to Hobbes, is the only way the ramifications of this state of nature could 
be averted. This view could be contrasted with Jean Jacques Rousseau who maintained, contrary to 
Hobbes, that humans originally were “noble savages” and that the chaining grip of civilization is what 
turns them into “beasts” (Held, 71). Nevertheless, while acquitting humanity from innate and inevitable 
evil, Rousseau also seems to acknowledge that particular social and political arrangements can produce 
tyranny, misfortune and repression. In that sense the necessity of the state as an intervening regulatory 
power is also, at least practically, implied. After all, under the human rights discourse and international 
treaties of the United Nations, states are delegated to protect and be held accountable to protecting the 
rights and liberties of its citizens.  
However, even the most powerful absolute sovereign cannot rule and regulate the interaction between 
its subjects or citizens without legitimacy and a relative acceptance by the people governed to a model 
of governance. More importantly governance cannot be exercised without the people exercising and 
embodying a sense of social solidarity. Nomadic and tribal societies, for example, based social 
solidarity on kinship because blood ties have “a force binding on most men” (Issawi, 106). This force 
motivates people to guard their impulse, cooperate and fear dishonor if they resort to violence to settle 
disagreements, seek their interests or end conflicts. This system operated in a way that quelled in-group 
aggression based on respect attributed to prestigious chieftains and the elderly. Additionally this system 
deterred out-group violence with the might of brave and powerful young men (106).  
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Social solidarity was later inspired by the ruler's proclaimed divine right to rule as more villages and 
tribes were integrated under a single banner of a monarch. Religion had not only legitimized the 
sovereign's power but also served as the common characteristic, common life and common values that 
reinforce social solidarity. The importance of religion's power to unite tribes and villages is conceived 
based on the idea that “proximity is the basis of solidarity” where the sovereign’s expansion of his 
territory eventually caused social solidarity to wane (Issawi, 105). That was particularly true with the 
move from village to city life where kinship and blood ties weakened or disintegrated and, 
consequently, social solidarity required something different to cement it. Issawi argues that “religion 
reinforces the power which a state has already acquired from its solidarity and numbers” where religion 
can attempt to obliterate potential conflicts between subjects of the state and, instead, turn them 
towards a common notion of truth, common desire and purpose (Issawi, 131).   
3. The State and Al-Azhar: An Uneasy Alliance  
The modern Egyptian state has particularly maintained the aforementioned reciprocal relationship with 
religion. The path through which the interdependence of the state and official religious institutions was 
weaved renders the binaries of religion and the state as well as modernity and Islam obsolete. In fact, 
for the most part, the modern Egyptian state and religious institutions have been conveniently 
imbricated tin a way that neither would adequately survive political disturbances and social changes 
without the other. In that sense religion is a particularly lucrative tool for the state to maintain its power 
and to legitimize its authority.  
In this regard it's important to realize that the Egyptian state and consecutive modern regimes found 
themselves in a dire renegotiation of boundaries with religious institutions to ensure their legitimacy, 
control and, hence, their survival. For example, against the social outreach and political power of the 
Muslim Brotherhood as well as the influence of the Saudi regime, President Nasser attempted to 
acquire the religious legitimacy of Al-Azhar and its scholars. Nasser's goal was to both counterpoise 
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the religious appeal of his opponents and to justify his socialist and foreign policies by, at least 
partially, invoking the state's brand of religion in the public debate. Nasser, accordingly, launched a 
series of reforms aimed at bringing the most supreme and revered religious institution under the banner 
of his state. These reforms included nationalizing endowments in 1952, which effectively stripped Al-
Azhar from economic autonomy, excluding scholars from the judicial body in 1955 and modernizing 
the curriculum taught in Al-Azhar by including natural and applied sciences (Zeghal, 375). These 
reforms aimed at controlling religion and befitting it to the regime's needs with neither obliterating it 
from the public sphere or over empowering it; both of which Nasser's regime could have not afforded.  
But if indeed the relationship between the state and religion is reciprocal as I've argued earlier, how 
could such control and appropriation be fathomed Zeghal argues that religious scholars and institutions' 
influence was not subsided but was rather dormant amidst the overwhelming popularity of Nasser, the 
repression of his opponents and the rise of Arab nationalism (374). The defeat against Israel in the 1967 
war proved to be a significant turning point and an opportunity for religious scholars and institutions to 
assert their relevance and exceptional importance to the nation and public affairs especially during the 
times of crisis.  
This overturn could be seen in Sadat's reliance on religious scholars to help him eliminate Nasserite left 
wing opposition given his strategies of liberalizing the economy as well as moving from the Soviet 
block and approaching the United States. Consequently, reciprocity was more profound in the 
relationship between the state under Sadat and religious institutions as the former needed to counter 
Arab nationalism and socialism by undermining their religious legitimacy. Al-Azhar was quick and 
adamant to adapt to changes in the political context and to seize the opportunity to become more 
relevant and central to Egypt's politics after years of submission to Nasser's regime. In 1972, following 
student demonstrations opposing Sadat, Muhammad Fahham then Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, 
proclaimed that leftists were unbelievers and, hence, must repent. This line of religious rhetoric was 
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adopted by the state propaganda machines where communism and socialism became synonyms to 
impiety and blasphemy (Zeghal, 382). Sadat's legitimacy in a sense, therefore, owed official religious 
institutions much more than Nasser regime ever did which led to Al-Azhar enjoying both the benefits 
of being part of the state bureaucracy and a considerable degree of political power that had been denied 
before.  
That is not to say that a turbulence in the state's relationship with religious institutions was not 
imminent as Al-Azhar's new found power meant that disagreements with Sadat would become less 
opaque. In 1974 Sadat, who was not comfortable with Al-Azhar's demands to completely transform 
Egypt's legal system to Islamic Sharia, issued a decree that gave the minister of endowments all the 
powers of the Grand Sheikh of Azhar. While that decree was later withdrawn, it nevertheless marked a 
significant crisis as Sadat obviously realized that the same power that bolstered his legitimacy was also 
one that could potentially undermine his rule. In 1976, Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar Abdul-Halim 
Mahmoud sent a letter to the president of the Parliament calling for the enforcement of Sharia given 
that “Islam is not an issue to be considered or put at the mercy of discussion in the name of democracy” 
(384). This ongoing political onslaught between the state and its religious institutions was largely put to 
a halt by the rise of another force brewed in the relatively liberalized political scene of Sadat's Egypt. 
Other Islamic factions such as the reemerging Muslim Brotherhood, Takfir wal Hijra and prominent 
religious figures that did not fall under Al-Azhar's control started to invade Al-Azhar's monopoly over 
Islamic discourse. However, it was the militant aspect of Takfir wal Hijra that forced Al-Azhar and the 
Ministry of Endowments to bolster their relationship with the state once more as not only was their 
monopoly over the religious discourse jeopardized but also the safety of their own lives.  
In 1977, sheikh Dhahaby, a former minister of Endowments, was assassinated by Takfir wal Hijra 
which is an event that highlighted many disturbing facts to both the state and its official religious 
institutions. Firstly, a new wave of Islamic groups and understanding of Islam was unraveling 
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independently from formal religious education and instruction. Secondly, these groups were not only 
discontent with the official religious institutions’ submission to the consecutive regimes but also 
motivated to actively and violently target their representatives. The emergence of independent Islamic 
groups and the assassination of sheikh Dhahaby, Zeghal argues, pinpointed once more official state 
scholars as “religious spokesmen for the regime” and, hence, becoming forevermore involved with 
political action without being in “the center of political arena” (385).  
The mutual antagonism between Al-Azhar and the state towards militant Islamic factions as well as the 
Muslim Brotherhood would continue to define the relationship between the state and its official 
religious institutions throughout what remained of Sadat's days in power and the three decades of 
Mubarak's rule. In the aftermath of Sadat's assassination by militant Islamists as well as the waves of 
terrorism during the 1990s, Mubarak's regime needed Al-Azhar to support its crackdown on radical 
Islam and in return was forced to heed to Al-Azhar's demands of further Islamizing Egypt (Zeghal, 
386). In addition, Mubarak's regime lacked a unique claim on legitimacy as the support for Arab 
Socialism dwindled leaving Mubarak's regime devoid of an ideology that is capable of winning the 
sympathy and support from the masses. In consequence, Mubarak was in a very difficult ideological 
struggle with Islamist factions that attempted to rally supporters over claims of religious legitimacy 
which perhaps was the only remaining clear and viable alternative to a population that became largely 
disenchanted with modernity, secularism and socialism.  
This political context forced Mubarak's regime to urgently seek Al-Azhar's support of its policies and 
crackdown on Islamists. In return, Al-Azhar was given more space in the political arena as well as 
control of all private mosques in 2002 which served as recruiting grounds for Islamists and particularly 
radical Islamic factions (Barraclough, 239). The state's delegation of Al-Azhar to counter the ideas of 
radical Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movements granted it an unprecedented 
autonomy in a political context where the “ideological emptiness of state power” was becoming more 
97 
 
and more apparent and more troublesome for Mubarak's regime (ibid). This autonomy could be 
highlighted with Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar Gad Al-Haq's critique of the state’s attempts to control 
religion, the role of the media which he perceived to attack Islam and the “moral dissolution of 
secularists” as Al-Haq put it (240). Secular intellectuals and artists in particular became the target of 
Al-Azhar whom they accused of propagating impiety and hostility towards Islamic mores. Cases 
against intellectuals such as Nawal El Saadawi, Nasr Hamed Abu-Zeid and Ahmed Sobhi Mansour as 
well as the assassination of Farag Fouda and the failed assassination attempt of Naguib Mahfouz 
showcased the rising hostility towards dissidents of mainstream religious discourse and the rise of Al-
Azhar's role in Egypt's political and social sphere.  
In summary, Al-Azhar went through a repressive phase of dormant co-option within the state under 
Nasser which was largely elevated under Sadat and then to a large degree of autonomy and relevance to 
the political arena in Mubarak's state. Nevertheless, at all times it seems that Al-Azhar and the state 
were interdependent since the Egyptian state has almost always required Al-Azhar to give it religious 
legitimacy. In return Al-Azhar benefited from state funding and legislation to preserve its attempts to 
monopolize religious discourses and bolster its weight in the political arena. Accordingly, it is not odd 
to have witnessed the grand Imam of Al-Azhar and the Egyptian pope on the center stage among 
representatives of other political groups when, then defense minister, Abdul-Fattah Al-Sisi announced 
on live television the ouster of Islamist president Morsi on July 2013.  
The official religious institutions' support of the current regime and the autocratic rulers before stems 
from a long practiced and embedded reciprocal relationship between the state and religious institutions. 
In short, removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power and hostility towards Islamism in general is 
not necessarily a trade for an otherwise secular, progressive and liberal state but rather a maintenance 
of the already established imbrication of state and religion. Accordingly, while the state maybe 
suspicious or hostile towards Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood, it's equally invested in its own 
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brand of Islam that is not necessarily tolerant of any dissent or challenge of state approved religious 
discourse.  
Based on this juxtaposition of both state and religion we can begin to understand not only why 
Egyptian atheists are targeted by the state but also why Muslim reformists who contend mainstream 
religious discourse are sometimes accused with similar charges of defamation of religion. Therefore, 
defamation of religion charges could be seen as both a strategic tool to control mainstream religious 
discourses and an appeasement to state run religious institutions that are angered and threatened by 
dissidence to their interpretation of Islam. This strategy is dictated by Al-Sisi's inheritance of a state 
that is suffering from ideological emptiness, threats from Islamist opposition and religious insurgency. 
4. The Egyptian State and Atheists: A State of Exception 
The most recent Egyptian constitution of 2014 declares in article (64) that “freedom of belief is 
absolute” and, thus, a question is begged to be answered; how come is it then that the Egyptian state 
invests in organized campaigns against atheism and that atheists find themselves under the scrutiny of 
the law? If freedom of religion is acknowledged as an absolute basic civil liberty by the constitution on 
which judicial bases are Egyptian atheists arrested and put on trial?  
Anthropologists and political theorists have observed that exceptional measures are often consequent to 
political crisis such as insurgency, violent internal conflicts and wars. Following the ouster of president 
Morsi, insurgency in the already troubled Sinai Peninsula significantly increased resulting in violent 
attacks against security forces that left dozens of security personnel dead and injured. State sovereignty 
is violently and systematically challenged in Sinai as well as in others parts of Egypt including the 
capital where several check points, police stations, and the infrastructure are targeted and attacked. 
Furthermore, dissidence to the current political regime by Islamists and other groups including football 
club supporters known as Ultras, revolutionary youth movements and various political forces is, despite 
the violent and legal crackdown, rampant with no viable political solution in sight. Such political crisis 
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incites exceptional political measures that impose a “state of exception” that represents a “point of 
imbalance between political fact and political law” (Agmaben, 1). In other words, the suspension of 
civil liberties such as freedom of belief, could not be understood by the law and is rather observed as a 
mere fact of the current political order that is independent of the law and the constitution. For example, 
after assuming power on February 1933, Adolf Hitler proclaimed a decree to protect the state and the 
people where constitutional articles regarding political liberties were suspended and in immediate 
effect any threat from potential dissidents or challengers was preemptively neutralized. Similarly the 
USA Patriot Act which was issued by the U.S. Senate on October 2011 following the September 11 
attacks authorized and legitimized the attorney general's power to detain aliens suspected of being 
affiliated with organizations or engagement in activities that “threaten the national security of the 
United States”. Agmaben argues that the patriot act which suspends constitutional rights of due process 
produced “legally unnamable and unclassifiable beings” who were stripped from any legal status 
recognized by American laws since they are “neither prisoners nor persons accused but rather 
detainees” (3).  
While Egyptian atheists are still recognized as citizens it's important to note that the state of exception 
is a pattern rather than a template that manifests itself identically in different political and social 
contexts. In that sense, Egyptian atheists are casted in the limbo of the state of exception where some 
and not all of their constitutional rights are suspended. Their citizenship, however, is obviously 
contested by state propaganda, as manifested in the national campaign against atheism, which 
proclaims that atheism is synonymous to the “erosion of moral values, spread of crime, psychological 
disturbance, suicide, depression and disintegration of families”. In other words, the Egyptian state is 
declaring that being atheist is inevitably and uncompromisingly the antithesis of good citizenship. 
Agmaben argues that this obscure state of exception, where the lines between the public law and 
political life are blurred, characterizes and defines “modern totalitarianism” which “allows for the 
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physical elimination of not only political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some 
reason cannot be integrated into the political system” (Agmaben, 2).  
But why is the state uninterested in integrating atheists in the political and social system? After all the 
current Egyptian regime builds a great deal of its legitimacy on a political discourse centered around 
“fighting terrorism” and protecting the Egyptian identity from Islamism so wouldn't it be pragmatic and 
practical not to antagonize a subgroup of Egyptian secularists who, more or less, agree on at least one 
particular article of the state's political agenda? 
The state's protection of its religious institutions' monopoly over religious discourse does not solely 
explain the prosecution of Egyptian atheists. In fact, with regards to stifling free speech, Egyptian 
atheists are a minority among many other categories of Egyptians whose civil liberties are restricted. 
However, the state has as a matter of fact singled out atheists as a category or a “phenomenon” that 
requires immediate attention and action from its ideological apparatuses. 
5. The Egyptian State and Atheists: Moral Panic and the Savage Slot 
Just as times of political crisis almost always incurs a state of exception for one or more categories of 
people, such a state of exception immediately induces a moral panic surrounding said categories. 
Whether or not the outcry against Egyptian atheists on private TV channels is organic (meaning that it's 
an independent reaction to more atheists exposing their ideas on the public space) or incited by the state 
is not possible to be clearly separated and determined. There are, however, enough precedents in the 
past to assume that the state is employing quite a familiar tactic to white wash its hostility towards 
Islamism.  
In the 1990s Egypt adopted conservative social measures to “outflank” Egyptian Islamists' religious 
claims and credentials who were being targeted by the security apparatuses in response to increase in 
terrorist activities (Dalacoura 45). In fear of being accused of being non-Islamic as the state intensified 
its crackdown on terrorist and militant groups the Egyptian government led a waves of arrests against 
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heavy metal music fans in 1996 whom it accused of being “Satanists” and, thus, “contemptuous to 
religion”. This was the culmination of various reports and investigative stories allegedly reporting 
“horrors” from underground metal gigs such as indulging in sex parties, sacrificing animals, drinking 
blood and worshiping the devil. While none of these charges stood to scrutiny by Egypt's General 
Prosecution, the buzz this case created almost immediately positioned the state as the guardian of 
public morals and proper religious faith. This shocking case to the Egyptian public highlighted Al-
Azhar's role as the vanguard of the Islamic faith in Egypt in what may have been a subtle reminder of 
its importance amid competition from various Islamist groups.  
A few years later, on May 2001 a few dozen men were arrested out of suspicion of participating in 
homosexual activity. The defendants were accused of debauchery and contempt to religion since the 
Egyptian law does not recognize or outlaw homosexuality. The state lavished in an “unprecedented 
media campaign” that emphasized publicizing the arrests, the trials and information of the defendants 
(Franke, 11). The more the details about the case were released and produced, the greater was the 
interest and coverage of the media. Consequently, the infamous Queen Boat incident, where dozens of 
individuals were arrested on suspicions of engaging in homosexuality, was rendered as one of the most 
significant public issue of 2001. The outcome was that Mubarak's regime was successful in setting a 
stage for an intriguing public distraction at time of economic crisis, reemphasizing the state's role as the 
vanguard of public morals and hence, implicitly, justifying repression of Islamist activism and stifling 
Islamist claims (Franke, 21).  
Sisi's regime faces a similar situation to that of Mubarak in the 1990s and early 2000s. The extremely 
violent repression of Islamists as well as the violent armed struggle with militants in Sinai and terrorist 
groups in Cairo, an assertion of the state's religiosity is necessary to maintain the state's religious 
legitimacy. The prosecution of Egyptian atheists is suspiciously similar to that of heavy metal fans and 
homosexuals as they could easily be singled out, fashioned and represented in the most horrific ways to 
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the public; savages who are inherently and fundamentally different than the rest of Egyptians and the 
morals and ideals by which the Egyptian state presumably stands to zealously protect. Furthermore, the 
representation of Egyptian atheists and highlighting them as a grotesque abomination inversely mirrors 
everything a good Egyptian citizen needs to be.  
The most important aspect of categorizing Egyptian atheists is that it immediately summons the need to 
define what a good Egyptian ought to be with religion at the center and, obviously, the state's religious 
institutions as the caregivers and dispensers of truth. It's in this particular juxtaposition of political 
strategies and public hostility towards freedom of religion that Egyptian atheists are conveniently 
situated in the savage-slot not as mere enemies of the state and the public but also as a constraining tool 
for legitimizing state oppression, monopoly over religious knowledge and state legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the state’s need to define the “good citizenship” highlights it’s hostility towards any 
perceived resistance to the regime of truth it seeks to maintain and reproduce. Atheism, just like 
alternative unsanctioned religious discourses, pinpoints a crack in its desired formation of social order. 
After all, because the state’s religious discourse justifies its power and control, undermining religion is 
perceived as a threat and an act of dissent towards it.  
This is not to say that Egyptian atheists necessarily think of themselves as agents of social change or 
think of atheism as a conscious resistance to the state. In fact, almost all of my interlocutors have 
expressed that they are neither interested in political activism nor advocacy of their rights as atheists. 
The question is could the state be overreacting or expressing an unwarranted paranoia with regards to 
the consequences of a slim fraction of its citizens developing an atheist identity? It’s precisely because 
of the improbability of atheism becoming a significant challenger to social order and the regimes of 
truth that the state’s reaction to atheism in Egypt should be contextualized within a broader hostility 
towards any sort of perceived dissent to its attempts to monopolize the public discourse. Consider, for 
example, the increased powers the state is delegating to its institutions and official syndicates to 
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regulate and control the Internet, art, religious discourses and the media. While atheism has been put on 
the pedestal of social inquisition, it’s not in an exceptional confrontation with the state. In other words, 
the state’s crackdown and prosecution of atheists is part of a larger and elaborate scheme to reinforce 
and bolster state power.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
To understand the state's prosecution and propaganda against Egyptian atheists we need to first observe 
two factors. First, the State is not merely acting on its own accord but rather complies with negative 
public opinion towards apostasy and freedom of religion. Therefore, by “battling atheism” and 
prosecuting atheists, given the general negative sentiment towards freedom of religion by the public, 
the state is performing its duty and expected role to “safeguard” Islamic values and beliefs. 
Furthermore, with the diminishing influence of the family as social and state agent to introduce and 
recreate social order and value-systems, as we've observed in chapter two, the state is attempting to 
counter the family's dysfunction in that regards. This is most certainly only aggravated by the threat 
globalization and cyberspace imposes to the social order and value-systems the state seeks to install 
and recreate. In a sense, the state's prosecution of atheists could be perceived as legal and political 
resistance to open spaces and international pressure to abide by western models of state-citizen 
relationship. Second, the prosecution of Egyptian atheists reflects the state's political agenda in 
response to the explosive ramifications of January 2011 uprising and particularly its attempt to redefine 
Egyptians as obedient, well-behaved and pious citizens. Accordingly, the propaganda that 
conceptualizes atheists as immoral, dangerous and, more importantly, “un-Egyptian” is made to 
contrast the qualities that the state desires, recognizes and presents as the “good citizen”.  
Furthermore, because “good citizenship” is framed by the state's version of “legitimate Islam”, 
propaganda against atheism is not only a way for the state to advance its political agenda but also to 
both assert its religiosity as well as the legitimacy and the need for official state-run religious 
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institutions. This is particularly important to account for given the aftermath of removing the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s man from presidency in July 2013 and particularly the Islamist's propaganda that the 
current regime is at war with Islam. In short, what I am trying to establish and argue in this chapter is 
that the prosecution, marginalization and stigmatizing of Egyptian atheists should not be merely 
analyzed socially and culturally. Instead, atheism in Egypt, should also be perceived as a mirror that 



























The aim of this research has been to both explain why some Egyptians turn to atheism and to explore 
the different ways by which they manage the stigma associated with their identity in their daily lives. In 
Chapter Two through the discussion of the literature on religious socialization and identity formation 
we've identified an overarching assumption that families where religion is not central to their values 
and daily lives predispose children to apostasy. While this has indeed been the case for three of my 
interlocutors, the remaining six have recalled that religious socialization was central in their childhood 
with varying degrees of intensity. In attempting to explain why some of the individuals who are heavily 
religiously socialized turn into atheism we've identified two possible explanations. First, there are 
pervasive cultural influences outside the family that overpower religious socialization. Second, strict 
religious socialization may often lead to conflicts where it backfires as the individuals seek to resist and 
confront their family's control which is often materialized in abandoning religion altogether. Through 
our analysis we've identified cases where the body was the “battlefield” between religious cultural 
formation and the desire for alternative lifestyles or the adoption of non-theistic world-views. Chapter 
two, however, left us with a gap and a significant unanswered question; where do these outside 
influences come from and how come they are so pervasive? I've attempted to answer this question in 
chapter three by looking at ways globalization has impacted the broader culture where both the 
imaginableness and appeal of alternative lifestyles and world-views becomes pervasive and 
conceivable. As discussed in my interlocutors' accounts, the heavy consumption of western cultural 
products and bilingual education are staples of upper middle class Egyptian families and many have, 
indeed, reported that it had a significant influence on their desires and perceptions of the world. 
Furthermore, the access to cyberspace has allowed many of my interlocutors to access information, 
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literature and ideas that are otherwise restricted or even banned. In chapter four we've moved the 
discussion from exploring how my interlocutors became atheists into how they have developed 
different ways to manage this identities. Based on some of the literature on atheism as a social 
experience, which was later confirmed through some of interlocutors' cases, there two basic coping 
mechanisms; passing and affirmation. The former involves social behavior and responses that doesn't 
give away information about their identity while trying at the same time to avert social pressure and 
questioning. The latter involves an outspoken attitude where only a couple of my interlocutors have 
reported occasionally adopting if their social status permitted it or if it was absolutely necessary to 
assert their identity to resolve a particular conflict. In addition to these modes, my interlocutors have 
also revealed a third coping mechanism that I've not encountered in my research which is to 
temporarily adopt a religious persona either physically by performing rituals or, more significantly, 
verbally to imply a religious identity. The significance of the latter is that it generates a reaction where 
public expression of impiety and irreligiosity is accepted and accommodated so as long as adherence to 
religion, despite not observing it in practice, is subtly implied. I've identified this as a code by which 
society has learned to accommodate alternative lifestyles and behavior where impiety is relatively 
accepted so as long as it is not perceived as a conscious and deliberate challenge to religion. In chapter 
five, to further understand how my interlocutors manage their identity in different social settings, I've 
examined public space as a social frontier of religious cultural formation and negotiation of religious 
identities in relation to “the code”. Accordingly, I visited three local cafés where some of my 
interlocutors hangout during the Friday prayers and observed their operation ethics during the prayers. 
There is one main pivotal observation that I've made; operation ethics are orchestrated by a sense of 
observance of the sacredness of religion. However, while that may seem to imply that all cafés would 
shut down during the prayers, it instead meant that observance of religion could be negotiated in a way 
that allows operation during the prayers and particularly in relation to visibility from within the 
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mosque. The café that was close but not visible from the mosque continued its operation normally 
while the other that was directly facing it had to shut down during the prayers so as not to “disrespect 
religion”. Because operating during the Friday prayers and in opposition of the mosque would be 
perceived as deliberate disrespect and disregard of religion, the café owner cannot accommodate 
individuals who, despite being Muslims themselves, don't want to perform these rituals. I concluded 
my research and analysis in chapter six by attempting to explain why the state has categorized Egyptian 
atheists as a threat. Firstly, by doing that, the state is assuming its expected role to “safeguard” Islam 
particularly in a social context where hostility towards freedom of religion is abundant. Secondly, the 
state is responding to a volatile political context where it needs to redefine “good citizens” and assert 
its own religiosity by marginalizing and silver lining atheists at the antithesis of being Egyptian. 
2. Deduction 
 
Despite the state's propaganda and social outcry, it makes no sense to speak in terms of a binary of 
authentic Egyptian identities and an alien or western ones that are imposed on Egyptians. Developing 
an atheist identity in Egypt is as organic as the development of any other identity and particularly 
religious ones. After all, most of the pathways to atheism that we've encountered were marked by some 
kind of critical life events, personal qualities, perks of socioeconomic statuses, familial relationships, 
variance in strictness of familial religious orientation, resistance, exposure to western cultural products 
which is normalized and integrated within religious socialization and access to the Internet. These 
overlapping and imbricated values are too complex and interdependent to neatly separate them from an 
imagined singular overarching tenet of “being Egyptian”. This is further exemplified by the strategies 
and methods by which religious identity and social expectations of behavior are negotiated to 
accommodate alternative lifestyles and desired behaviors that don't necessarily conform to orthodoxy.    
3. Limitations of the Research 
I've mainly relied on the accounts of my interlocutors in my research. In the end, despite goodwill and 
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willingness to cooperate, these accounts are present time recollections of sporadic and fragmented 
memories. As with most anthropological research employing an investigation on life histories, it is very 
important to acknowledge that some important details may not be captured or even realized by the 
interlocutors. In other words, there might have been overlooked stories and details that might have 
made revelation with significant implications. In addition because it was initially difficult for me to 
find participants outside my social circle, I've primarily relied on snowball sampling. Consequently, my 
research is primarily on upper middle class Egyptian atheists. Accordingly, I don't claim to represent or 
account for all Egyptian atheists or even for upper middle class Egyptian atheists. As was revealed in 
the research, the pathway to atheism responds to both social, economic and political context as it also 
responds to critical and individual life events. I project that further research which could include more 
accounts and particularly those in a different social class would have significantly different 
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